this determination is merely a variation of constant presence, which now becomes representedness to a subjectum. Therefore absolute idealism, though it seems to dissolve everything into being, actually carries out the complete disempowerment of being in favor of an undisputed and limitless empowerment of beings
Only the philosophical naivete of "epistemology" and the "epistemological" interpretation of idealism were able to give rise to the erroneous view that "idealism" is far from reality and needs to be rectified through a reversion to "realism." The "realism" of the nineteenth century in fact lives entirely off absolute idealism. No reversion is carried out, but only a submersion into an unphilosophical interpretation of idealism. Thereby, admittedly, the disempowerment of being [Sein] concealed in idealism seems to be justified through the concern with beings. This concern must then redeem itself through notions of value wherever it retains enough presence of mind to recognize that even the unconditioned affirmation of reality and of "life" (and thus of beings) still requires a trace of nonbeings, though indeed nonbeings can no longer be acknowledged as being [Sein]. If the "consideration" of the history of metaphysics retains the perspectives of "idealism" and "realism," then "idealism" will always seem to be the philosophically more genuine posture, inasmuch as it still speaks of being, over and against beings. Nevertheless, it remains the case that in "idealism" the philosophical (and in realism the unphilosophical) disempowerment of being is carried out. That must be recognized so as not to misinterpret forthwith the transition from metaphysics to the other mode of questioning being.
The question of being is now becoming the question of the truth of beyng. The essence of truth is now interrogated out of the essential occurrence of beyng and is grasped as the clearing of what is self-concealing and thus as belonging to the essence of beyng itself. The question of the truth "of" beyng reveals itself as the question of the beyng "of" truth. (The genitive is here an idiosyncratic one and could never be captured by the previous, "grammatical" genitive.) The questioning of beyng now no longer thinks on the basis of beings; instead, as an inventive thinking of beyng (cf. Beyng, 265. The inventive thinking of beyng), it is compelled by beyng itself. The inventive thinking of beyng leaps into beyng as the "between" in whose self-clearing essential occurrence the gods and humans come to mutual recognition, i.e., decide about their mutual belonging. As this "between," beyng "is" not a supplement to beings, but is what essentially occurs such that in its truth they (beings) can first attain the preservation proper to beings. This priority of the "between," however, must not be misinterpreted idealistically in the sense of the "apriori."