VIII. Beyng [435-436]

being. no philosophy, could ever be verified by "facts." i.e .• by beings. To make itself understandable is suicide for philosophy. The idolizers of "facts" never realize that their idols shine only in a borrowed light. They are indeed not supposed to realize that. for it would immediately make them perplexed and. accordingly. useless. But idolizers and idols are used only when the gods are absconding and so are announcing their nearness.

The disentanglement of philosophy from the snares binding it to the grounding of science. to the interpretation of culture. to serving world-views, and to metaphysics as its proper first essence (which deteriorates into its distortion) is merely the consequence of the other beginning, and only as such a consequence can it truly be mastered. The other beginning is the more original appropriation of the concealed essence of philosophy, an essence which itself arises out of the essence of beyng and which, according to the specific purity of the origin, remains closer to the essence of decision pertaining to the thinking "of" beyng.

The disentanglement then has as its consequence a necessary change in the usual way of representing what philosophy is. precisely within the sphere of the always persistent everyday opinion. namely. no longer an edifice of thinking but the apparently random bestrewal of blocks quarried from the bedrock, with the chisels and crowbars remaining invisible. Are the blocks secluded configurations or disjoined pieces for holding up an invisible bridge? Who could know that?

Philosophy. in the other beginning, questions by way of asking for the truth of beyng. Seen from the horizon of the now explicit difference between beings and being and calculated on the basis of a historiological comparison to metaphysics and its starting point in beings. the questioning in the other beginning (the thinking of the historicality of beyng) might look like a simple inversion, i.e., here, a crude one. Yet it is precisely the thinking of the historicality of beyng which knows, from the essence of mere inversion, that in such a procedure the most inflexible and insidious enslavement is at work and that the inversion does not overcome anything; it merely brings the inverted into power all the more and provides the inverted with a previously lacking entrenchment and completeness.

The questioning of beyng out of the historicality of beyng is not an inversion of metaphysics; it is instead a de-cision as the projection of the ground of that difference to which even the inversion must adhere. Such projection brings this questioning altogether outside of that difference between beings and being. This questioning therefore now even writes being as "beyng," which is supposed to indicate that being is here no longer thought metaphysically.

Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger