first place, that projections are thrown into that which, thanks to the clearing provided by the projections, afterwards becomes a being and allows beyng only as a mere supplement to itself, a supplement contrived through "abstraction."
It is immediately customary for us to think of these projections as forms of representation which make possible an encounter with objects: the transcendental condition of Kant. Indeed, we do well to practice thinking of beings as such with regard to this interpretation of beingness as objectivity. Nevertheless, this Kantian interpretation stands on the "ground" of the subjectum and resides in the sphere of representation. The "projection" becomes characterized as "subjective" in the best sense—i.e., not "egoistic" or "subjectivistic" in the epistemological sense but "subjective" in the metaphysical sense of subjectum—as that which lies at the ground, is unquestioned, and is unworthy of question. The interpretation of Kant's thought can here gain essential clarity and can then lead us to see that, even with this position of the subject, philosophical thinking does not make it past (schematism and transcendental imagination) the abysses. Yet we would already need to have become questioners with respect to other domains, so as not to mis-characterize this conception of Kant as an exaggerated peculiarity but so as to take seriously this reference to the abyssal.
That will not occur at all, unless our reading of Kant has shifted its basis—from the "subject" to Da-sein.
This is a step on a historical path leading to the nearness of that thinking which understands the projection no longer as a condition of representation but as Da-sein and as the thrownness of a clearing which has found a stand whose first accomplishment is the bestowal of concealment and thereby the manifestation of the refusal.
Nevertheless, for us today, it remains difficult in every respect to experience the projection as event out of the essence of ap-propriation as refusal. That would require nothing other than to keep every disarray from beyng and to know that this latter, the most powerful, becomes in the sphere of human concoctions the most fragile, especially since the human being has long been accustomed to weigh the sovereignty of beyng with the scales used for measuring the power of beings, to weigh only with those scales, and never to venture that which is most question-worthy.
Moreover, we have been moving from ancient times in a projection of beyng, though the projection could never be experienced precisely as such. (The truth of beyng was not a possible question.)
That this question does not arise is the constant impetus for the history of the basic metaphysical positions, an impetus which as such does not merely remain obscure to this history. It also remains absent, which