is why the metaphysics of absolute idealism can "construe" itself, in its own developmental history, as the consummation of metaphysics
That the subjectivity of the subjectum ultimately develops into the absolute is merely an obscure sign that the projection essentially occurs constantly ever since the beginning of the history of being, announcing itself as that which has not been fabricated and cannot be fabricated, and that this projection nonetheless is finally explained on the basis of the unconditioned which also and precisely conditions being. With this "explanation," philosophy strikes up against an end. Nietzsche's rebellion is merely the inverse of this state.
Meanwhile, however, beings in the form of objects and objectively present things have become ever more powerful. Beyng is restricted to the last wisp of the most abstract and general concept and everything "general" is suspected of having no power and no reality, of being merely "human" and therefore also "far from essential." Because beyng is posed in the guise of the most general and emptiest, it no longer even needs to be explicitly repudiated in favor of beings. We are so far advanced that we can "make do" without beyng. This unique state of the history of mankind is, "fortunately" for humans, scarcely recognized, let alone grasped, and certainly not taken up into the will of history. For now it runs inconsiderately into its most proximate consequences. One is then immediately able to make do even without beings and is satisfied with objects; i.e., all "life" and all reality can be found in bustling about with objects. At one stroke, procedures and arrangements, mediating and dispelling, become more essential than that to which all this applies. "Life" is engulfed by lived experience, and the latter itself is raised into organized lived experience. The organization of lived experiences is the highest lived experience in which people find themselves together. Beings are merely an occasion for this organizing, and what place is beyng then supposed to occupy? Yet meditation now gains a view of the decisive point of history, and knowledge becomes attentive to the fact that only by traversing the most extreme decisions can a history still be saved in face of the gigantic lack of history.
It is therefore futile to search through history, i.e., through its historiological transmission, in order to encounter beyng itself as projection. An intimation of this essence of beyng could strike us only if we were already equipped to experience ἀλήθεια as in the first beginning. Yet how far removed are we from that and how definitively?
Even if thoroughly distorted and unrecognizable, the still unbroken predominance of "metaphysics" has reached the point that beyng represents itself to us only as a side effect of the representation of beings as beings. It is from this Western basic determination (at first