still genuine as οὐσία) that all variations in the interpretation of beings then arise.
That also is the reason we still seem to move within the domain of representation, and this even within the necessity of experiencing (inventively thinking) the truth of beyng. We grasp the "ontological," even when grasped as a condition of the "ontic," indeed only as something supplementary to the ontic, and we repeat the "ontological" (the projection of beings onto beingness) once again as a self-application to itself: the projection of beingness (as a projection of beyng) onto its truth. There is at first no other way that could come out of the horizon of metaphysics and make the question of being graspable at all as a task.
Through this procedure, beyng itself is apparently still made into an object, and what is reached is the most decisive opposite of what the first approach to the question of beyng had already opened up for itself. Yet the point of Being and Time was indeed to expose "time" as the domain of projection for beyng. Of course; but if the matter had rested there, then the question of being would never have developed as a question and thus as an inventive thinking of what is most question-worthy.
Therefore the task was to overcome, at the decisive place, the crisis of the question of being in the way that that question necessarily had to be expounded at first, and especially to avoid an objectification of beyng-to avoid it by, on the one hand, withholding the "temporal" interpretation [die "temporale" Auslegung] of beyng and yet also by attempting to make the truth of beyng "visible" independently of that interpretation (freedom toward the ground in "On the Essence of Ground"; especially the first part of that treatise still adheres strictly to the ontic-ontological schema). The crisis could not be mastered merely by thinking further in the already established direction of questioning. Instead, a manifold leap into the essence of beyng itself had to be ventured. That, in turn, required a more original insertion into history: the relation to the beginning, the attempt to clarify ἀλήθεια as an essential character of beingness itself, the grounding of the difference between being and beings. The thinking became ever more historical; i.e., the distinction between a historiological and a systematic consideration became ever more untenable and inappropriate.
Beyng itself announced its historical essence. But there arose and still remains a fundamental difficulty: beyng is supposed to be projected in its essence, and yet the projection itself is the "essence" of beyng, pro-jection as ap-propriation
Concerning the development of the question of being into the inventive thinking of beyng, the more steadfast in beyng this thinking becomes, the more relentlessly must it abandon every representational