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VIII. Beyng [454-455]

En-counter [Ent-gegnung] is the ground of engagement [Begegnung] which is not yet at all sought here.

En-counter is the ripping open of the "between" toward which the oppositionality [Gegeneinander] happens as one that requires an open realm.

What pertains to the "human being" here, and what is left behind? In casting loose, the human being is grounded in that which this being cannot fabricate but can only venture as a possibility, namely, Da-sein.

To be sure, this only if one does not turn back, and never turns back, to oneself as someone who appeared in the first casting loose in the guise of an over-and-against, a φύσει ὄν, a ζῷον ["living being"].

What is to be ventured is the casting loose and the grounding of the essence of the human being in the strangeness of the open realm. Only now begin the history of being and the history of the human being. As for beings? They no longer come to their truth in a turning back, but as the preservation of what is strange. Strangers bring to themselves what is strange with respect to the appropriating event and allow the god to be found in what is strange.

The casting loose never succeeds from mere human initiative and human devising.

This casting is one that is thrown in the oscillation of the appropriating event, which means that being touches the human being and displaces this being into the transformation, the first winning, and the prolonged losing of the human essence.

This traversal of the straying of the essence, as the history of the human being, is independent of all historiology.

And if the gods sink within what is not bestowed of the withholding of beyng.



264. The projection of beyng and the understanding of being


According to the way it is introduced in Being and Time, the understanding of being has a transitionally ambiguous character; in correspondence, so does the designation of the human being ("human Dasein," the Dasein in the human being).

On the one hand (glancing back, as it were, to metaphysics), the understanding of being is grasped as the actually ungrounded ground of the transcendental and in general of the representation of beingness (all the way back to the ἰδέα).

On the other hand (because understanding is grasped as pro-jection, and the latter as thrown), the understanding of being is an indication


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger