nothing at all regarding whether, now as well, the guideline of thinking (1) is thinking (2), and whether here something like a guideline comes into play at all, as it does in the treatment of the guiding question. Now, in the transition to the other beginning, the question of being indeed becomes the question of the truth of beyng in such a way that this truth, as the essence of truth, belongs to the essential occurrence of beyng itself. The choice of guideline becomes superfluous and indeed is now impossible from the start. Being is no longer taken as the beingness of beings, as a supplement represented from the point of view of beings, a supplement that simultaneously appears as the apriori of beings (i.e., the apriori of what comes to presence). Rather, beyng now essentially occurs in advance in its truth. This implies that even thinking (1) is determined exclusively and in advance on the basis of the essence of beyng and is not at all, as has been the case since Plato, taken to be a purified representation of beings on the basis of beings. The apprehension of being is not determined from the grasp of beingness in the sense of the κοινόν of the ἰδέα but, instead, out of the essential occurrence of beyng itself. Beyng must originarily and inceptually be reached in a leap so as to decide (out of itself, as it were) of which essence thinking (1) and the thinker must "be." This manifold "must" announces the quite peculiar necessity of a plight which itself can belong only to the essence of beyng.
We have been bound to the tradition for so long and so tightly, however, that we cannot avoid at least co-intending in the term "thinking" always and immediately the representing of something in general and thus the representing of a unity of subordinate differentiations of kinds. Moreover, when thinking is grasped as the thinking of being, that then counts as the most general of all. Every question of being stands in the light of this question regarding what is most general, and the most general can be secured only through a grasp of its particularizations and their interrelations. To grasp this that is most general then indeed means merely to leave it in its indeterminateness and emptiness, to posit indeterminacy as its unique determination, which means to represent it itself immediately.
In this way, through the ordinary ("logical") concept of thinking, the essence of beyng is again already decided in advance, whereby the essence itself is likewise understood in advance as having the character of an object of a representation.
Yet we must free ourselves even from that, so as to leave entirely to beyng itself the disposing-determining power in the essential characterization of thinking (inventive thinking). The Greek interpretation of ὂν ᾗ ὄν as ἕν, the obscure priority always possessed up to now by oneness and unity in the thinking of being, can surely not be