derived from logic and from the fact that λόγος as assertion plays the role of guideline, for indeed this understanding of λόγος presupposes a determinate interpretation of ὄν (ὑποκείμενον). Upon closer inspection, that unity is merely the foremost way presencing as such appears to gathering representation (λέγειν); it is in this presencing that beings have indeed already gathered themselves in what they are and in the fact that they are. Presence can be grasped as gathering and thus as unity and even must be so grasped, since λόγος has priority. Yet unity, in itself and by itself, is not an originary determination of the essence of the being of beings. Unity necessarily strikes the inceptual thinkers, because the truth of being has to remain concealed to them and to their beginning and because, in order to grasp being at all, presencing must be latched onto as the first and most proximate way in which being shows itself. Thus the ἕν, but always at the same time related to the many—as things that come and go, arise (become) and perish (presencing and absencing in presence itself: Anaximander, Heraclitus, Parmenides). For the other beginning, this unshaken and never questioned determination of being (unity) still can, and indeed must, become question-worthy, and then unity points back to "time" (the abyssal time of time-space). Then we also see, however, that with this priority of presence (the present), wherein unity is grounded, something has been decided, namely, that this which is most self-evident harbors the most alienating decision. Furthermore, we see that this decisional character belongs indeed to the essential occurrence of beyng and hints at the uniqueness in every instance, and the most originary historicality, of beyng itself.
We can already infer from this, even with just a vague knowledge of the history of beyng, that beyng is indeed never sayable definitively and therefore never even sayable in a merely "provisional" way, although the previous interpretation (which makes beyng the most general and emptiest) would feign otherwise.
That the essence of beyng can never be said definitively is not a shortcoming. On the contrary, the non-definitive knowledge adheres precisely to the abyss and thus to the essence of beyng. This adherence to the abyss belongs to the essence of Da-sein as the grounding of the truth of beyng.
To adhere to the abyss is at once to leap into the essential occurrence of beyng in such a way that beyng itself unfolds its essential power as the appropriating event, as the "between" for the indigence of god and for the stewardship of the human being.
The inventive thinking of beyng, the naming of the essence of beyng, is nothing other than the venture of helping the gods out into beyng and making available to the human being the truth of what is true.