occurs as the ground of the ones en-countering each other in this ground. That determines the simplicity of the "between," a simplicity which is not emptiness, but is instead the ground of the fullness arising out of the en-counter as strife.
7. The simplicity of beyng is marked by uniqueness. This simplicity does not at all need to be set in relief and does not need differences, not even the difference from beings. For this difference is required only if being itself is branded a kind of being and thus is not at all preserved as the unique but is instead generalized into the most general.
8. The uniqueness of beyng grounds its solitude, in accord with which beyng casts round about itself only nothingness, whose neighborhood remains the most genuine one and the most faithful guardian of the solitude. As a consequence of its solitude, beyng essentially occurs in relation to "beings" always only mediately, through the strife of world and earth.
In none of these appellations is the essence of beyng fully thought, yet in each of them it is "wholly" thought; "wholly" means here: in each case the thinking "of" beyng is wrenched by beyng itself into its unusualness and is deprived of any recourse to the explanations that could be provided by beings.
Event always means event as ap-propriation, de-cision, en-counter, un-settling, withdrawal, simplicity, uniqueness, solitude. The unity of this essential occurrence is non-objective and can be known only in that thinking which must venture the unusual—not as the peculiarity of something odd, but as the necessity of that which is most inconspicuous and in which are opened up the abyssal ground of the ground-lessness of the gods and the grounding condition of humans and in which, furthermore, something is assigned to beyng that metaphysics could never know, namely, Da-sein.
By recalling the old differentiations (being and becoming) which were usual until Nietzsche brought them to their end, the determination of beyng as event might be thought to correspond with the interpretation of being as "becoming" ("life," "motion"). Even apart from the unavoidable relapse into metaphysics and the dependence of the representations of "motion," "life," and "becoming" on an understanding of being as beingness, such an interpretation of the event would completely lead away from it. The reason is that this interpretation speaks of the event as an object instead of letting its essential occurrence (and only this) speak for itself such that thinking would remain a thinking of beyng which does not talk about beyng but, instead, says beyng in a saying that belongs to what is opened up in the saying. Such a saying would also avoid all objectification and falsification of the event as something congealed (or, on