the other hand, as something "fluid"). Otherwise, the plane of representation would be broached and the unusualness of beyng denied.
The full essential occurrence of beyng in the truth of the event allows the recognition that beyng and only beyng is and that beings are not. With this knowledge of beyng, thinking first attains the trace of the other beginning in the transition from metaphysics. The position of metaphysics is that beings are, non-beings also "are," and beyng is the being that is most eminently.
The other position is that beyng uniquely is and therefore "is" never a being and certainly not the being that most eminently is. But beings are not, and precisely for that reason the thinking of beingness, having forgotten beyng, attributes beingness to beings as their most general property. In the usual way of representing, this attribution has its rights, and therefore in opposition to it we must declare: beyng essentially occurs, and beings "are."
Beyng is. Does not Parmenides say the same thing: ἕστιν γὰρ εἶναι? No; for precisely here already εἶναι stands for ἐόν ["beings"]. In other words, being is here already the being that is most eminently, the ὄντως ὄν, which immediately becomes the κοινόν, ἰδέα, the καθόλου ["universal"] .
Beyng is—that means beyng alone essentially occurs its own essence (event) [das Seyn west allein das Wesen seiner selbst (Ereignis)]. Beyng essentially occurs—it must of course be said in this manner if spoken with regard to metaphysics, which maintains that beings "are" (the ambiguity of transitional thinking).
Beings are; this is said on the basis of the mostly implicit basic position of metaphysics, according to which the human being encounters beings as what is closest, proceeds from them, and goes back to them. Thus the assertorial character of this proposition is different than in the case of saying that beyng is. "Beings are" must be carried out as a pro-position [Aus-sage] which has its correctness; it is directed toward beings and reports on their beingness. Here pro-position (λόγος) does not merely mean the subsequent linguistic expression of a previous representation; instead, pro-position (ἀπό-φανσις) is here the basic form of the relation to beings as such and thus to beingness.
The saying "beyng is" possesses a very different character as something said (cf. Überlegungen IV, p. 1f.). Admittedly, this saying could always be taken as a proposition and a propositional assertion. Then, thought metaphysically, it must be concluded: beyng in this way becomes a being and, it follows, the being that is most eminently. The saying does not express about beyng something that supervenes to it in general, something objectively present in it; on the contrary, it says beyng itself out of itself. It says that beyng alone is master of its