essence, and, precisely for that reason, the "is" can never become something merely supervenient to it. The saying says beyng out of the "is" and, as it were, back into the "is." At the same time, however, this characterizes the basic form to which every saying "about" beyng (better: every saying of beyng) must adhere. For this saying "of" beyng does not have beyng as an object; instead, it arises from beyng as from its origin and therefore, when it is supposed to name the origin, always speaks back into this origin. Accordingly, here all "logic" falls too short in its "thinking," since λόγος, as assertion can no longer remain the guideline for the representation of being. At the same time, however, the saying is drawn into the ambiguity of the assertion, and the thinking "of" being becomes essentially more difficult. Yet this is merely evidence of the first proximity to the remoteness of beyng: the fact that beyng "is" the very refusing and unsettling and, as such, must be preserved in the event. Beyng will therefore always be difficult and will be a struggle manifest in the extreme depths as the play of that which pertains to the abyss.
If beings are not, then that means beings continue to belong to beyng as the preservation of its truth and yet can never transfer themselves into the essential occurrence of beyng. Beings as such, however, do distinguish themselves with regard to their respective belongingness to the truth of beyng and with regard to their exclusion from the essential occurrence of beyng.
What now becomes of the differentiation between beings and beyng? We are currently grasping it as the merely metaphysically conceived, and thus already misinterpreted, foreground of a de-cision which is beyng itself (cf. no. 2 above). This differentiation can no longer be read off from beings in a progression to the generalization that sets their being out in relief. Nor can the differentiation be justified by referring to the fact that "we" (Who?) must understand being in order to experience any being precisely as a being. That fact is indeed correct, and reference to it can at any time serve as a first indication of being and of the capacity of beings and beyng to be differentiated. And yet: what results here, what is already presupposed here, namely, the metaphysical thinking of beingness, cannot constitute the basic trait in which the essence of beyng and the essence of its truth were able to be grasped, in their essential occurrence, in terms of the historicality of being and in the mode of Dasein (cf. Beyng, 271. Da-sein). Nevertheless, the transition to the other beginning cannot be prepared unless the courage for the old (of the first beginning) comes to the fore in the transition and thus the attempt is first made to propel the old, in its own setting, beyond itself: beings, being, the "meaning" (truth) of being (cf. Being and Time). Yet from the very outset it must be seen that