repudiates every appearance of having been fabricated. Here beyng reveals itself in that essential occurrence whose abyssal character is the reason the en-countering ones (gods and humans) and the conflictual ones (world and earth) attain their essence in their originary history between beyng and beings and admit the commonality in the naming of beyng and beings only as something most question-worthy and most separated.
When the gods and humans come into en -counter through the plight of beyng, humans are cast out of their previous, modern, Western position. They are posited back behind themselves in completely other domains of determination, wherein neither animality nor rationality can occupy an essential place, even if the subsequent establishment of these properties in actual human beings might have its justification. (Thereby it always remains to ask who these are that find such procedures justified and even build "sciences" like biology and the study of race upon them and use them, presumably, to lay the ground of a "worldview." Indeed, this is the ambition of every "worldview.")
The projection of beyng as event first allows us to surmise the ground of history and thus also its essence and essential place. History is not a prerogative of humans; instead, it is the essence of beyng itself. History plays out only in the "between" of the en-counter of gods and humans, with this "between" as the ground of the strife of world and earth; history is nothing other than the eventuation of this "between." Therefore historiology never attains the level of history. The differentiation separating beyng and beings is a de-cision deriving from the essence of beyng itself and reaching from far, and only in that way is it to be thought.
If beyng is understood as a condition in any sense whatever, it is already degraded into something in the service of beings and supervenient to them.
Thinking in the other beginning does not know any explanation of being by beings and knows nothing of any conditioning of beings by beyng. Such conditioning [Bedingnis] always also places beyng in the service of [verdingt] beings, though in such a way as to lend preeminence to beyng in the form of the "ideal" and "values" (the ἀγαθόν is the beginning).
To be sure, by its very form and as a consequence of the way of representation that has long been customary in metaphysics, and also with the corroboration of the language and the entrenched meaning that bear the stamp of metaphysics, any talk of beyng can be misinterpreted and taken in terms of the ordinary relation of the condition to be conditioned. This danger cannot be met immediately; indeed it must be accepted as part of the dowry of metaphysics. The