history of metaphysics cannot be thrust aside when the essence of history first comes into play in the original projection of beyng.
269. Beyng
The human being must "experience" the utter unusualness of beyng, over and against all beings, and must be ap-propriated by it into the truth of beyng
Beyng is reminiscent of "nothing," but least of all is it reminiscent of "beings," whereas every being reminds us of its like and perpetuates its like. This perpetuation creates the usual way of representation, which at once deteriorates such that even being (as the most general and the continuously recollected: cf. the Platonic ἀνάμνησις, which expresses this usual way of representation) is taken as a being, the "highest" being.
Beyng is reminiscent of "nothing," and therefore nothingness belongs to beyng. We know little enough of this belonging. But we do know one of its consequences, which is perhaps only in appearance as superficial as it pretends to be: we dread and abhor "nothingness" and believe we must always zealously devote ourselves to its condemnation, since indeed nothingness is sheer nullity. Yet what if the proper motive of the flight from the (misinterpreted) nothingness were not the willing of the "yes" and of "beings" but, instead, the aversion to the unusualness of being? Then the usual comportment to nothingness would harbor simply the usual comportment to beyng as well as the avoidance of the venture of that truth in which all "ideals," "goal-settings," "desirables," and "resignations" come to naught on account of their triviality and superfluousness.
The utter unusualness of beyng, over and against all beings, then requires the unusualness of the "experience" of beyng as well. The rarity of such experience and knowledge is therefore also not surprising. Such knowledge cannot be brought about straightforwardly. Rather than incite a false and fruitless striving for such a goal, we should simply attempt to think of what pertains to such knowledge of the completely un-usual.
By calling beyng the unusual, we thereby grasp beings of every sort and extent as the usual, even if something new and hitherto unknown emerges among beings and upsets what was before. With time, we always accommodate even this novelty and incorporate beings into beings. Yet beyng is the un-usual that not only never emerges among beings but that also essentially withdraws from every attempt to accommodate it.