379
§269 [481-482]

Being is the un-usual in the sense that it is impervious to everything usual. In order to know it, we must therefore distance ourselves from all conventionality; because conventionality is precisely our contribution and our constant pursuit, however, we could never achieve this distancing on our own. Beyng itself must extract us from beings; i.e., inasmuch as we are immersed in beings, beleaguered by them, beyng itself must un-settle us, free us from this beleaguering. The beleaguering of humans by beings is doubled: humans themselves are beings, pertain to beings, belong among them, but at the same time humans have beings, precisely as such, openly round about themselves, before, beneath, and behind themselves, within the horizon of a whole (a world). Nevertheless, this "beleaguering" does not signify anything that is to be eliminated, as if it were an accidental and unseemly burden. Instead, it is integral to that which constitutes the con-frontation of the human being (as a being in the midst of beings) with beings. This con-frontation is not merely a type of human undertaking (in the sense of the "struggle for existence"); it is instead an essential jointure of the being of the human being. All the same, there is that un-settling from beings which does not dissolve the con-frontation but, quite to the contrary, founds it and therefore bestows on it possibilities of groundings in which humans create beyond themselves.

This un-settling eventuates only out of beyng itself, however; indeed beyng is nothing other than what un-settles and is un-settling.

The un-settling consists in the ap-propriation of Dasein, specifically such that, in the "there" which clears itself in this way (i.e., in the abyssal ground of the unsupported and unsecured), the ap-propriation withdraws. Un-settling and withdrawing are integral to beyng as the event. Nothing occurs amid beings thereby, and beyng remains inconspicuous. Yet, with regard to beings as such, it can happen that they, having been placed into the clearing of the un-usual, throw off their usualness and then must place themselves up for de-cision as to how they might measure up to beyng. This does of course not mean how they might assimilate themselves to beyng or correspond to beyng; instead, it means how they preserve and lose the truth of the essential occurrence of beyng and thereby come to their own essence, which consists in such preservation. The basic forms of this preservation, however, are the disclosure of an entirety of worlding (world) and the self-seclusion in the face of every projection (earth). These basic forms first allow the preservation to arise, and they themselves reside within the strife that essentially occurs out of the intimacy of the eventuation of the event. On each respective side of this strife, there is what we know metaphysically as the sensuous and the non-sensuous.


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger