Why precisely this strife of world and earth? It is because Da-sein is appropriated in the event and becomes the steadfastness of the human being and because the human being is called, out of the whole of beings, to the stewardship of beyng. Yet what about that which is in strife on the basis of which we have to think of the human being and the "body," "soul" and "spirit" of this being in a way that accords with the historicality of beyng?
Beyng un-settles by appropriating Da-sein. This un-settling is a disposing, indeed the original tearing open of what is dispositional itself. The basic disposition of angst withstands the un-settling, inasmuch as this un-settling [Ent-setzen] occurs as negating in the original sense, i.e., de-poses [ab-setzt] beings as such. In other words, this occurrence of negation is not a simple negating but-if it must be interpreted at all in relation to the comportment of position-taking-an affirming of beings as such in the guise of the de-posed. The occurrence of negativity, however, is precisely the de-posal itself, whereby beyng, as the un-settling, consigns itself to the clearing of the appropriated "there."
Furthermore, as the occurrence of negativity by which beyng occurs in its with-drawal, thoroughly irradiated by nothingness, beyng essentially occurs. Only if we have liberated ourselves from misinterpreting nothingness on the basis of beings, only if we determine "metaphysics" on the basis of, and from, the occurrence of the negativity of nothingness, rather than the reverse, namely, basing ourselves on metaphysics and the priority of beings which is in force there and thus degrading "nothingness" to a mere denial of the determinateness and mediation of beings, as did Hegel and all metaphysicians before him, only then will we surmise what power of steadfastness rushes into the human being out of the "unsettlement," intended now as the basic disposition of the "experience" of beyng. Through metaphysics, i.e., through Christianity, we are misled and accustomed to seeing in "unsettlement" (to which angst belongs as nothingness does to beyng) only the wild and the ghastly instead of experiencing it as disposing toward the truth of beyng and, on the basis of that disposition, coming to a steadfast knowledge of the essential occurrence of beyng.
In the first beginning, inasmuch as φύσις was illuminated in ἀλήθεια and as ἀλήθεια, wonder was the basic disposition. The other beginning, that of the thinking of the historicality of beyng, is disposed and pre-disposed by unsettlement, which opens Da-sein to the plight of the lack of a sense of plight. In the shelter of this plight, the abandonment of beings by being is concealed.