384
VIII. Beyng [487-489]

unsecured and unprotected into the abyssal ground and, therein, to overreach the gods.

This reaching over the gods is a going under as grounding the truth of beyng.

But beyng ap-propriates Da-sein for the sake of grounding its own truth, i.e., for its clearing, because, without this clearing de-cision of itself into the indigence of god and into the stewardship of Da-sein, beyng would have to be consumed in the fire of its own unremitting incandescence.

In what way could we know how many times this has indeed already happened? If we did know that, it would then not be necessary to think beyng in the uniqueness of its essence.

In the being that is the human being, Da-sein as steadfastness grounds the abyssal ground which beyng throws out and yet bears in the appropriation. The being of the human being, however, is itself determined only out of Da-sein, inasmuch as Da-sein transforms the human being into the stewardship of the indigence of the gods. The human being of such an (only futural) essence "is" not originary as a being, since only beyng is. Nevertheless, the human being determined in the manner of Da-sein is indeed still preeminent among beings, inasmuch as the essence of this being is grounded on the projection of the truth of beyng, a grounding that consigns this being, as mediately appropriated, to beyng itself. The human being is in this way excluded from beyng and yet is precisely thrown into the truth of beyng, such that Dasein undergoes the exclusion in renunciation, and this exclusion is of being. The human being stands like a bridge in the "between," and the appropriating event, as this "between," propels the indigence of the gods to the stewardship of the human being by consigning this being to Da-sein. Such propelling consignment, from which thrownness arises, introduces into Da-sein the transport into beyng. That transport appears to us at first as the projection of the truth of beyng and, in the facade it offers most immediately and readily to metaphysics, appears as the understanding of being. Yet there is no room at all here for the interpretation of the human being as "subject," whether in the sense of the egological or communal subject. Nor is the transport a matter of standing outside oneself in the sense of losing one's self. Rather, it grounds the very essence of selfhood, which means that humans have their essence (the stewardship of beyng) as their proper-ty [Eigen-tum] insofar as they are grounded in Da-sein. But to have their essence as a property means that humans must steadfastly carry out the acquisition and loss of the fact that (as well as how) they are the appropriated ones (the ones transported into beyng). To be the explicit proprietor of


Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event) (GA 65) by Martin Heidegger