instead of proceeding from the historiological "subject," the subject conducting the investigation. What is the object of historiology then supposed to be? Is "objective historiology" merely an un-attainable goal? It is not a possible goal at all. Then there is also no "subjective" historiology. Historiology, by its very essence, is grounded on the subject-object relation. Historiology is objective because it is subjective, and insofar as it is the latter, it must also be the former. Therefore an "opposition" between "subjective" and "objective" historiology is entirely senseless. All historiology ends in an anthropological-psychological biographism.
274. Beings and calculation
Calculative planning makes beings ever more representable and, from all possible explanatory viewpoints, more accessible, indeed such that these capacities to be controlled are for their part unified among themselves, become more prevalent, and thus expand beings into what is in appearance without limit—but precisely only in appearance. In truth, with the ever-greater compass of research (historiology in the broadest sense) there is carried out a displacement of the gigantic from that which undergoes the planning to the planning itself. The moment planning and calculation become gigantic, beings as a whole start to shrink. The "world" becomes ever smaller, not only in the quantitative sense but also in its metaphysical significance: beings as beings, i.e., as objects, are ultimately so dissolved into their controllability that the character of beings with respect to being disappears, so to speak, and the abandonment of beings by being is consummated.
The metaphysical diminution of the "world" produces an eroding of the human being. The relation to beings as such no longer has a goal in them or with them, and the relation, as a comportment of the human being, relates only to itself and to the planning for which it is carried out. The feeling of emotion feels nothing but feeling, and emotion itself becomes the object of pleasure. "Lived experience" reaches the extremity of its essence, and lived experiences become objects of lived experiences. The lostness in beings is lived as the capacity to transform "life" into the calculable whirl of an empty selfcircling and to make this capacity credible as "closeness to life."