§5 [13-14]

The questioners have broken the habit of curiosity; their seeking loves the abyss, in which they know the oldest ground.

If a history should be granted us once again, namely, the creative exposure to beings out of a belonging to being, then the destiny is inescapable: to prepare the time-space of the last decision—whether and how we experience and ground this belonging. That means: to ground through thought the knowledge of the event, by way of the grounding (as Da-sein) of the essence of truth.

No matter how the decision may turn out regarding history and lack of history, the questioners, who in thought prepare that decision, must be; may they all bear the solitude in their greatest hour.

Which saying effects the highest thoughtful reticence? Which procedure is most likely to bring about reflection on beyng? The saying of truth; for truth is the "between" for the essential occurrence of beyng and for the beingness of beings. This "between" grounds the beingness of beings in beyng.

Yet beyng is not something "earlier"—existing in itself, for itself. Instead, the event is the temporal-spatial simultaneity for beyng and beings (cf. The interplay, 112. The "apriori").

In philosophy, propositions are never subject to proof. This is so not only because there are no highest propositions, from which others could be derived, but because here "propositions" are not at all what is true, nor are propositions simply that about which they speak. All "proving" presupposes that those who understand, as they come to stand before the represented content of the proposition, remain the same, unaltered in following the representational nexus that bears the proof. And only the "result" of the course of the proof can require a changed mode of representation or, rather, require the representing of something previously unheeded.

In philosophical knowledge, on the contrary, the very first step sets in motion a transformation of the one who understands, and this not in the moral-"existentiell" sense, but rather with respect to Da-sein. In other words, the relation to beyng and, ever prior to that, the relation to the truth of beyng are transformed in the mode of the transposition into Da-sein itself. Because, in philosophical knowledge, in each case everything is transformed at once—the being of humans into its standing in the truth, the truth itself, and thereby the relation to beyng—and because, accordingly, an immediate representation of something objectively present is never possible, philosophical thinking will always seem strange.

Especially in the other beginning, the leap into the "between" must be carried out instantly—in pursuit of the question of the truth of beyng. The "between" of Da-sein overcomes the χωρισμός ["separation"]