161. Being-toward-Death [282-284]

On the one hand what is sheltered here is the essential belongingness of the not to being as such—which here, in Da-sein distinguished as grounding the truth of being, comes to light with a singular keenness.

On the other hand being-toward-death shelters the unfathomable and essential richness of "necessity," again as the one cleft of being itself—again being-toward-death with Da-sein as its measure.

In being-toward-death is the collision of necessity and possibility. Only in such spheres can one intimate what in truth belongs to that which "ontology" deals with as the pale and empty hodgepodge of "modalities."

161. Being-toward-Death

No one has yet surmised or dared to ponder what was thought ahead regarding being-toward-death in the context of Being and Time and only there, i.e., what was thought "fundamental-ontologically" and never anthropologically and in terms of "worldview."

The uniqueness of death in human Da-sein belongs to the most originary determination of Da-sein, namely to be en-owned by be-ing itself in order to ground its truth (openness of self-sheltering). What is most non-ordinary in all of beings is opened up within death's non-ordinariness and uniqueness, namely be-ing itself, which holds sway as estranging. But in order to be able to intimate anything at all of this most originary connection in terms of the ordinary and used-up standpoint of common opinion and calculating, the relation of Da-sein to death itself, the interconnection of resolute disclosedness [Entschlossenheit] (enopening) and death, and running ahead [toward death] had to be made manifest in advance, with full keenness and singularity. But this running ahead toward death is not for the sake of reaching sheer "nothing" but on the contrary: so that openness for be-ing opens up, completely and from within the utmost.

But it is totally in order that, when thinking here is not done "fundamental-ontologically" with the intention of grounding the truth of be-ing, the worst and most absurd misinterpretations creep in and spread—and, naturally, a "philosophy of death" is made up.

The misinterpretations of precisely this section in Being and Time are the clearest indications of the incapacity—which is still in full bloom—for re-enacting the questioning that is prepared there, and that means always at the same time thinking more originarily and creatively explicating further.

That death is projected-open-in what is fundamental-ontologically ownmost to Dasein, within the essential context of the originary futurality of Dasein—means initially, in the confines of the task of Being and Time, that death is connected to "time," which is established as the domain of projecting-open the truth of be-ing itself. This is already an