of ruin is nothing other than death: not the dying-properly and it is quite different, the end of the properly-dying. This end threatens and makes possible the analysis itself as a discourse of delimitation, of guaranteed dissociation, of the border or the determined closure (in the double sense of de-termination, that of the logic of termination [terma, peras, finis], and that of the resolute decision or of resolution—let us not forget that the analysis of Being and Time is also the great discourse on Entschlossenheit).

Heidegger does not say this and he cannot say it anywhere in Being and Time up to its interruption, even if such an (aporetic) form of the nonsaid can always be interpreted as denied revelation, avowal, betrayal, or symptomatic transgression, and as a secret that cannot be kept and presents itself cryptically. Besides, death is always the name of a secret, since it signs the irreplaceable singularity. It puts forth the public name, the common name of a secret, the common name of the proper name without name. It is therefore always a shibboleth, for the manifest name of a secret is from the beginning a private name, so that language about death is nothing but the long history of a secret society, neither public nor private, semi-private, semi-public, on the border between the two; thus, also a sort of hidden religion of the awaiting (oneself as well as each other), with its ceremonies, cults, liturgy, or its Marranolike rituals. A universal Marrano, if one may say, beyond what may nowadays be the finished forms of Marrano culture.

Heidegger would thus say that for Dasein impossibility as death—impossibility of death, the impossibility of the existence whose name is "death"—can appear as such and announce itself; it can make itself awaited or let itself be awaited [se foire attendre ou se laisser attendre] as possible and as such. Only Dasein would be capable of this aporia, only Dasein has a relation to death as such, and this relation is not dissociable from its ability to speak, the animal being deprived of both possibilities or abilities. And it is only in the act of authentic (eigentlich), resolute, determinate, and decided assumption by which Dasein would take upon itself the possibility of this impossibility that the aporia as such would announce itself as such and purely to Dasein as its most proper