the culture characterized by the so-called religions of the Book. Despite all the distance taken from anthropo-theology, indeed, from Christian onto-theology, the analysis of death in Being and Time nonetheless repeats all the essential motifs of such ontotheology, a repetition that bores into its originarity right down to its ontological foundation, whether it concerns the fall, the Verfallen, into the inauthenticity of relaxation or distraction, or the sollicitudo, the cura, and the care (Sorge), or sin and originary guilt (Schuidigsein) , or anxiety, and, regarding the texts, whether it concerns St. Augustine, Meister Eckhart, Pascal, Kierkegaard, or a few others. Whatever the enigma of this repetition, as well as of the concept of repetition deployed by Heidegger, I'll just say, without being able to go into it in any depth, that neither the language nor the process of this analysis of death is possible without the Christian experience, indeed, the Judeo-Christiano-Islamic experience of death to which the analysis testifies. Without this event and the irreducible historicity to which it testifies. The same could be said for Freud's and Levinas's thought, mutatis mutandis. Considering what we just have seen concerning borders, demarcations, limits, the only characteristic that we can stress here is that of an irreducibly double inclusion: the including and the included regularly exchange places in this strange topography of edges. Instead of deploying the concept at length, I will simply point to the example.
On the one hand, no matter how rich or new it may be, one can read a history of death in the Christian West, like that ofAries for example, as a small monograph that illustrates like a footnote the extent to which it relies, in its presuppositions, upon the powerful and universal delimitation that the existential analysis of death in Being and Time is. The existential analysis exceeds and therefore includes beforehand the work of the historian, not to mention the biologist, the psychologist, and the theologian of death. It also conditions their work; it is constantly presupposed there.
However, on the other hand, conversely but just as legitimately, one can also be tempted to read Being and Time as a small, late document, among many others within the huge archive where the