Jacques Derrida



Heidegger's Ear

Philopolemology

(Geschlecht IV)



1.

The friend is silent. This friend. Keeps silent. Here, at least, this friend says nothing. One could nearly conclude from this, from then on, that this friend utters nothing determinable: Heidegger evokes nothing said by or no saying, however friendly, of the friend. The voice of this friend does not necessarily speak. This friend could be aphasic. One could even be physically deaf without ceasing to carry [porter] its voice bei sich, with oneself, through its voice. With oneself does not mean right next to oneself. With oneself does not mean the nearest, the closest, nor in oneself. In its strict grammaticality, the phrase says that Dasein carries with it the friend itself, and not only its voice: "als Hören der Stimme des Freundes, den jedes Dasein bei Sich trägt" (SZ, § 34, p. 163). Through its voice that I hear, I hear the friend itself, beyond its voice but in that voice. I hear and carry the friend with me in hearing its voice. Of course, bien entendu, Dasein "carries" the friend itself, but not the friend in its totality, in flesh and blood. Dasein carries it, one might say, in the figure of its voice, its metonymic figure (a part for the whole). What about this rhetoric that seems to complicate the grammar without, however, contradicting it? For it is indeed the friend and not its voice that I hear. What about this exemplary part that seems to be valid for the whole? Why does the voice play this role? And why does hearing assure this presence of the friend permanently carried by Dasein "bei sich"? The question of this privileged metonymy will no longer leave us.

Where then is this voice? Where does it come from? It seems to be neither in us, nor outside us, but within the friend. Neither in our ear, nor outside our ear. But what does "bei Sich tragen" mean to say? Where is an ear? What is the inside and the outside of an ear? What is it, for an ear, to (be) open? What is it to prick up one's ear [tendre l'oreille]? To hear [entendre] or not to hear? To be deaf, not to be able or to be unwilling to hear, perhaps in the sense in which Heidegger will speak later (1933—34), about Hölderlin's Der Rhein, about mortals that turn, as is said in French and English, a "deaf ear" (das Überhören)? Unlike gods and poets, "Mortals hear like those that cannot hear (als nicht-hören-können); their understanding [entente] is the deaf ear (das Überhören) and the will-not-to-hear (Überhörenwollen)" (GA 39: § 14, p. 200; I cite this decisive passage immediately for fear of not having the time to devote all the necessary attention to it here later, as well as to what is said of Überhören and of misunderstanding, mishearing, sich Verhören, in the lecture Logos [1951], or to what is said of the ear in Der Satz vom Grund [1955—56]).

Where then is the ear that we lend, as is said in French and English, in particular the ear we lend to the voice of the friend? What is the ear, in the literal [propre] sense, if there is such a sense? What, properly speaking, is the ear, the ear as such and in its singularity? It is true that, however elliptical Heidegger's little phrase, it seems already to assure us that we do not even take the initiative in lending or pricking up the ear to the voice of the friend. Through this voice, Dasein carries the friend with it, whether it wishes to or not, whether it knows it or not, and whatever its resolution. In any case, what matters here is not what the friend's voice says, not its said, not even the saying of its said. Hardly its voice. Rather what matters is the hearing (das Hören) of its voice. Das Hören is the principal theme of this chapter. And this hearing could not open Dasein to "its ownmost potentiality-for-being (sein eigenstes Seinkönnen)," if hearing were not first the hearing of this voice, the exemplary metonymy of the friend that each Dasein bears close by itself (bei Sich trägt). The enigma is situated perhaps not far, very close by, if not within these few words, "bei sich" and "tragen." Let us not forget that the expression bei Sich will have struck, in the German tongue, the statement [énoncé] of one of the most obscure things, nothing less than absolute knowledge at the end of Hegel's greater logic, the pure concept as it conceives itself, "the simple being to which the idea determines itself . . and [that] is the concept that, in its determination, remains close by self (das einfache Sein, zu dem Sich die Idee bestimmt . . . und ist der in seiner Bestimmung bei Sich selbst bleibende Begriff)."1

This friend does not speak, but is also invisible. The friend does not appear [paraît, apparaît] any more than it comes to speak or to a decision [il ne prononce ou ne se prononce]. The friend has no face, no figure [figure]. No sex. No name. The friend is not a man, nor a woman; it is not I, nor a "self," not a subject, nor a person. It is another Dasein that. each Dasein carries, through the voice it hears, with itself (bei Sich trägt), neither within itself, in the ear, in the "inner ear," inside a subjective interiority, nor far away, too far from the ear, for one can also hear from afar, in an exterior space or in some transcendence, but in its vicinity [parages], at a distance that is neither absolute—absolutely infinite—nor null in the absolute proximity of an ownness [propriété], nor then determinable according to some objective unit of measurement in the world. This carrying-distance [portée] of the voice, this être-à-portée de voix, as one would say in French, this being within earshot of the voice, appears of another order.

That perhaps is what one can be authorized to say, in order to begin, about the friend such as it is apparently named, only once named, in a brief parenthetical clause of Sein und Zeit. This allusion seems unique, remains so brief and so enigmatic that almost no one has lent it any attention or even judged it necessary to stop at it, except, to my knowledge, Christopher Fynsk, Jean-François Courtine, and Jean-Luc Nancy to whose brief and recent incursions2 I pay tribute as I am getting ready today to engage myself in a direction that was not theirs.

The friend, then, seems named once in Sein und Zeit, but keeps silent even if its voice is evoked. The friend does not appear, has the visibility of no determined figure or face, has no subjective, personal, sexual status; one cannot even decide if the friend is living or dead. When I say that the friend is named, that is still too much, for it has no proper name; the friend calls perhaps, but is not then called, and nothing permits one to suppose that the friend is singular even if the common noun that designates it, "the voice of the friend," is grammatically singular. "The voice of the friend" seems rather to confer on it a kind of oneness that does not exclude plurality. A friend is always the friend. This friend is always the friend. As will be seen, a certain singularity remains required; this friend is not the concept friend, nor the friend in general. The friend thus commonly named is not called; the author of Sein und Zeit does not address the friend, does not say to it, as Hölderlin or Aristotle in famous apostrophes, "O, friend," "O, friends." One then can hardly say that the friend is named by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit. I prefer to say that the friend is only evoked. Why only evoked? For three reasons:


(1) First of all, because of the furtive and enigmatic brevity of the passage. The passage of the word "friend," rather than of the friend, in a parenthetical clause, is as suspended as it could be in a poetic evocation, without well-marked premises or consequences.


(2) Evoked, next, because the friend itself is not the one named in such an abstract and indeterminate way, not the friend in itself and in toto; by metonymy, so to speak, by figure, is evoked just a part of the figure of the friend, in the general sense of the word "figure" and in the sense in French of figure as "face," visage: evoked not in itself, en soi, such as it is, this figure, this face, the figure of the friend such as the friend is in itself, but the voice of the friend by me, by the Dasein I am, by a certain ear of the Dasein each of us is. And still the question remains open of knowing whether the ear can here be named by figure or in the literal [propre] sense, indeed beyond this rhetorical alternative. The problem of the literal or figurative sense of the ear (but also of the eye) of thought will be thematized in Der Satz vom Grund (chap. 6; I have spoken of that elsewhere and perhaps I will have time to come back to it today from another point of view). The friend's voice, the friend in its voice is not in itself [en soi], but in me, but not even in me as Dasein, for Dasein is not a "self," not an "I," and Heidegger specifies that this friend whose voice I hear, this friend is carried by every Dasein "bei sich," with itself, close by itself. The voice of the friend is neither within itself, nor designated as itself, nor within me, nor in a Dasein that could include it as a part or a moment of its own proper constitution, in its very own ear, even if the friend's being-carried seems in effect constitutive of Dasein, for Heidegger does say of every Dasein. The enigma of the "bei sich" excludes at once exclusion and inclusion, transcendence and belonging, the exteriority of an absolute stranger and the intimacy of the completely near, distance and proximity. The friend whose voice I hear is not here present, not even present now on the telephone, even if it is there, however, taking part in the being-there of Dasein, and so in the Da of Sein. It is then difficult to assign a site to this voice of the friend by every Dasein. And we will not know what the ear of Dasein is inasmuch as we will not know what hearing (hören) this voice of the friend or hearing in general signifies. The difficulty is doubled or imprinted again in the word "trägt." Although the voice is not within it, Dasein carries the friend in carrying its voice. Dasein carries with it the friend, its voice or the hearing of this voice of the other friend as if these three constituents, hearing, voice, the other-friend, formed in the silent displacement of the same chain, as it were, a unique carrying of this carrying-distance of the voice [une seule portée de cette portée de voix].

But what does "carry" (tragen, porter, bear) mean in this case? Carry not in the sense of carry within oneself, but carry by oneself (bei sich), carry without carrying, carry the other? Carry some other thing than oneself in the difference and yet in a certain proximity between what carries and what is carried? What can an ear help us to hear and understand on this subject? Far from being able to comprehend starting from some other thing, from more familiar schemas, what is this carrying-distance of the voice of the friend by every Dasein, perhaps it is starting from this hearing of the voice of the friend by oneself [auprés de soi] for Dasein that one will be better able to hear and understand what not only friend, but also Dasein, "voice," "carrying-distance," "being-by," and "ear," etc., mean. To begin to read the carrying-distance of this "Tragen" with the seriousness it calls for, it would be necessary to neglect nothing of the thinking attention that Heidegger accords to the German semantics of Tragen and to all the potential resources that he exploits on this or with which he plays, as he will do in particular much later, on a motif that is not just any motif, since it is a matter of nothing less than difference, of one of the names he gives to difference (Unter-schied), to wit, Austrag.

Without having the time to engage myself in this here, I only recall that this singular writing of Tragen is deployed in particular in Die Sprache, precisely, the text in Unterwegs zur Sprache that dates from 1950, and so from 23 years after Sein und Zeit. Its title, Die Sprache, thus reproduces a part of the title of the chapter of Sein und Zeit in which we read this evocation of the voice of the friend that every Dasein bei Sich trägt, namely, "Dasein und Rede. Die Sprache." In Die Sprache, without in fact [méme] neglecting the idiom of "carrying to term," as is said of a child "carried to term" by its mother, in French "porté à terme" and in German "ein ausgetragenes Kind," Heidegger describes what I shall call the singular spacing of the call (Ruf). Like the voice of the friend, carried with Dasein by Dasein, the call is neither in the ear nor far from the ear, is neither near nor far away. And to describe this topics or this atopics, Heidegger calls to the light of day [fait venir au jour] all the enigmas in gestation in the semantics of Tragen. Let me select, for lack of time, a few lines in accordance with what is called in them by the friend's voice thus carried. I cite the lines in German, but I shall not translate them; rather I shall hold myself between translation and paraphrase. In Die Sprache, Heidegger listens in to a Trakl poem, as he will do again elsewhere, at the place where Trakl also speaks of the brother and of the stranger in a text I spoke about some years ago. The sentences I am going to read follow the famous passage that says "Die Sprache spricht. Dies heißt zugleich und zuvor: Die Sprache spricht. Die Sprache? Und nicht der Mensch? Der Ruf ruft zwar her. So bringt er das Anwesen des vordem Ungerufenen in eine Nähe.. . . Das Herrufen ruft in eine Nähe. Aber der Ruf entreißt gleichwohl das Gerufene nicht der Ferne, in der es durch das Hinrufen gehalten bleibt. Das Rufen ruft in Sich und darum stets hin und her; her: ins Anwesen; hin: ins Abwesen" (US 20—21 {GA 12: 17}): Speech speaks. That also and •first of all means: speech speaks. Speech? And not man? ... The call calls indeed to come here. It thus brings to proximity the presence of what beforehand was not called. ... The call to come calls to a proximity. But, for all that, the call does not uproot what it calls from the distance in which what is called remains held by the call that carries itself toward it. The call calls in itself and thus always goes and comes; here, toward presence, there, toward absence.

Everything said here of the call and its spacing, of its relation to distance and to proximity, to presence and absence, to "neither-inside-nor-outside," seems to me to suit what was already said of the Rufcharakter des Gewissens or of Das Gewissen als Ruf der Sorge (§§ 56—57) in Sein und Zeit ("The character of conscience as a call," "Conscience as the call of care"), as well as what was said of the voice of the friend that every Dasein carries with it (bei Sich trägt)—in a site that is neither included nor excluded, neither interior nor exterior, neither near nor far, what already differs from a certain concept of the Aristotelian φιλία that is always tied to the values of presence, proximity, familiarity. Just as well in Sein und Zeit as in Die Sprache, the analysis of Ruf must no doubt be brought into contact with this little phrase on the voice of the friend, on the carrying- distance [portée] of this voice. I shall say, abusing a little the French idiom, that the rapport between these two portées of the voice is to my mind more than an analogy or a coincidence. I will come back to this.

And farther on, still in Die Sprache, following again the motif of the Geviert that gathers (versammelt: this will once more be my guiding thread) das Dingen der Dinge ("the thinging of things"), Heidegger advances in the space that relates or refers Tragen to Austragen as carrying (to term) [portée], gestation, bringing into the world that brings to term or to birth, and to Austrag as difference or διαφορά. Διαφορά signifies at once difference (Unterschied), but also the differend, disagreement, the dis- by which one is carried to one side, by which one is separated in being carried along in the discord. In διαφορά, as in rapport, relation, reference, difference, there is the reference to ference, to carrying [portée], to the Greek φέρω or the Latin fero, to διαφορά (I differ, I defer, I separate, and I carry, I bear, to the end). I cite again: "Die Dinge tragen, indem sie dingen, Welt aus": "Things, as they unfold their thing-being, bring into the world, carry the world (to the world)." "Unsere alte Sprache nennt das Austragen: bern, bären, daher die Wörter 'gebären' und 'Gebärde'. Dingend Sind die Dinge Dinge. Dingend gebärden sie Welt" (US 22 {GA 12: 19}): "Our old tongue names this 'carrying to term' (Austragen) bern, bären, from which come the words 'Gebären' [give birth, carry to term, deliver, bear children: all gestation] and 'Gebärde' [gesture, deeds, behavior, how one carries oneself, comportment]. In unfolding their thing-being are things things. In unfolding their thing-being, they [here I risk a neologism] 'gest' ['gestent'] world [they carry it during gestation, carry it to term, give it a comportment, a countenance, a figure, a face, a gesture]."

Now the other name of what carries the world to the world and to term in the Austrag is the gathered unity or intimacy of the dif-ference (Unter-Schied that Heidegger writes here in two words) or of the διαφορά. I am again going to read and, if not translate, at least paraphrase a passage in which this constellation of difference gathered into unity, of tragen, Austrag and Nachträglichkeit, of walten, gönnen, and of Ereignis should introduce us "nachträglich" (25 years behind) to the thought of friendship that is announced in the little phrase of Sein und Zeit I am just now trying to approach. At the same time, in this passage, the selection or the cutting out I must do for lack of time will follow the course of concepts and words that will be, I think, indispensable for us to approach the configuration of φιλεῖν, πόλεμος, λόγος, on the path of thinking of Heidegger. The names of these concepts then are tragen, Austrag, nachträglich, walten, gönnen, Ereignis. They all resist translation, which is why the violence of my gesture will consist not only in cutting out but in paraphrasing rather than translating.

Heidegger has just said that the world accords to things the favor of their essence or their unfolding. The word that is important here to me is gönnen; we'll see why shortly and how it translates for Heidegger the very movement of φιλεῖν in φύσις, as he follows its traces in Heraclitus: "Diese [Welt] gönnt den Dingen ihr Wesen. Die Dinge gebärden Welt. Welt gönnt die Dinge" (US 24 {GA 12: 21}). The world offers, gives, let us rather say accords, to things their being, their essence, the unfolding of what they are. I prefer the word "accord" to the word chosen by the French translators ("offer") [or the English translator ("grant")] to translate gönnen. For we find in this word, besides the sense of generous gift, that of accord, of ἀρμονία, of harmony. as accord quasi musical and perceptible to a certain ear. This harmony will be of importance to us shortly in our reading of Heidegger's Heraclitus. Then this world accords to things their being. Things carry the world (to term or in gestation: die Dinge gebärden Welt). The world is the accord of things, world equals accord of things (Welt gönnt die Dinge), the world accords things in the double sense of giving things, giving to things their essence but also their accord.

Farther on one sees appear the walten that, as we'll shortly see, will have long commanded all the thought of the Heraclitean πόλεμος as Heidegger interprets it. Intimacy, interiority (Innigkeit) that gathers the world and things is not a confusion (Verschmelzung). This intimacy prevails, imposes itself or its force, indeed its violence; it rules or dominates (waltet); it l'emporte, I would say in French, or in English, it carries the day, only where the inside (das Innige), world, and thing are purely separated, disjoined (rein Sich scheidet), and remain disjoined, separated, dissociated (geschieden bleibt). In the middle of the two, in the between that separates world and thing, in their "inter," in this Unter of the Unter-Schied, in the dis- of the dif-ference, the separation carries the day (in ihrem inter, in diesem Unter- waltet der Schied). Then, after insisting on the fact that dif-ference (Unter-Schied) must no longer be heard here as the name of a general concept holding for all possible differences, but as this difference, the one and unique (als dieser Eine. Er ist einzig.), Heidegger names this difference "der durchtragende Austrag," what carries to term, in the sense of birth and gestation, what always carries and includes [comporte] the other itself in and up to separation but in the intimacy of the difference. The intimacy of the dif-ference (Die Innigkeit des Unter-Schiedes) is what unites or unifies the διαφορά (das Einigende der Διαφορά). If one takes into account that in the words διαφορά or difference, then in Greek as well as in Latin, the division or separation is in rapport, like rapport and the word "rapport" itself, like relation, with the portée or the port of porter (φέρειν, fero), one finds more than justification and necessity for what resembles the play of Heidegger with the semantics of tragen, when he writes for example: "Die Innigkeit des Unter-Schiedes ist das Einigende der Διαφορά des durchtragenden Austrags. Der Unter-Schied trägt Welt in ihr Welten, trägt die Dinge in ihr Dingen aus. Also sie austragend, trägt er sie einander zu": The intimacy of the dif-ference is the uniting of the διαφορά of what carries to term in having carried through and through. Dif-ference carries to term the world in its becoming-world, carries to term things in their becoming-thing. Carrying them thus to term, it relates them one to the other. Der Unter-Schied, the dif-ference does not mediatize after the fact [aprés coup] (vermittelt nicht nachträglich) in connecting world and things with the help of an added-on mediation (durch eine herzugebrachte Mitte). Dif-ference first discovers (ermittelt), makes world and things accede, as mediation (als Mitte), to their being (Wesen), that is, to their mutual rapport (in ihr Zueinander), whose unity it carries to term (dessen Einheit er austrägt) (US 25 {GA 12: 22}).

The German semantics of Tragen, Austrag, Nachträglich—which we are following here as the problematics of Unter-Schied or difference and which I am trying to translate into the Latin semantics of port, of rapport, of relation, of the portée, of porter à terme (carrying to term), of comportment, etc., with a view to problematizing and better interrogating the phrase of Sein und Zeit that we will not lose from view (das Hören der Stimme des Freundes, den jedes Dasein bei Sich trägt)—Heidegger tends to want to protect this semantics, justly, against a certain Latinization. It is necessary to insist on this, because the whole historial perspectivizing of φιλεῖν, of πόλεμος, and of λόγος—whose reconstitution I would like to try to sketch—essentially implies, as we will see, a sort of Greco- German alliance and a foreclosure [forclusion], indeed the diagnosis of a decay of φιλεῖν into amicitia. Where we are, in Die Sprache, Heidegger underscores that Unter-Schied is no more a distinction between objects (Gegenstände) of our representation (Vorstellen) than it is a relation between world and thing. If "relation" has the same etymology as the ferre of difference or reference, like the whole family of "port," "porter," "rapport," etc., one sees that it is a matter of dissociating the thought of tragen and of Austrag from every relational distinction, indeed from every objective "dimension," for Heidegger next takes analogous precautions concerning the Latin word dimension. I paraphrase again a passage before coming back to the voice of the friend with Dasein concerning which we already know we must avoid speaking of proximity or distance, of relation or distinction, of inside and outside, of objectivity and subjectivity. In the last passage I am getting ready to paraphrase again, Ereignis and Gönnen appear, which gather what at once will be more and more inseparable in Heidegger's thought (a thought of the Ereignis that would be less a mode of being [eine Art des Seins] than being would be a mode of Ereignis [eine Art des Ereignisses]3 and a thought of that gift accorded or according that, as we'll see, Heidegger has never ceased to place in the heart of φιλεῖν). Here then is this passage. It marks that all that "Unter-Schied" is not, all that from which "der Unter-Schied" must be carefully distinguished is said in Latin: "Der Unter-Schied ist weder Distinktion noch Relation": "The Unter-Schied is neither distinction nor relation" (US 25 {GA 12: 22}).

"Das Wort 'Unter-Schied' meint demnach nicht mehr eine Distinktion, die erst durch unser Vorstellen zwischen Gegenständen aufgestellt wird." The word Unter-Schied then no longer signifies a distinction established between objects by our representation only. "Der Unter-Schied ist gleichwenig nur eine Relation, die zwischen Welt und Ding vorliegt, so daß ein Vorstellen, das darauf trifft, sie feststellen kann." The dif-ference is just as little a simple relation present between world and thing and such as the representation can establish it after encountering it. "Der Unter-Schied wird nicht nachträglich von Welt und Ding als deren Beziehung abgehoben." Dif-ference is not abstracted after the fact (nachträglich) from the world and the thing as their rapport. "Der Unter-Schied für Welt und Ding ereignet Dinge in das Gebärden von Welt, ereignet Welt in das Gönnen von Dingen" (US 25 {GA 12: 22}). The untranslatability culminates in this sentence: Dif-ference for world and thing ereignet . . . things in the gesture of gestation of the world, it ereignet the world in the gift accorded of things.

This detour through an overloaded context permits beginning to read Tragen and gönnen. This "carrying" and this "according" (in the double sense of the gesture of according a gift or a favor, gönnen, and of the harmonic accord) will have marked the Heideggerian thought of φιλεῖν. I hope that this detour will not seem too long nor anachronic when, returning nearly a quarter century earlier, we must try to hear what this brief and elliptical allusion to the voice of the friend that each Dasein bei Sich trägt says.


(3) There was a third reason why I said this friend was only "evoked." This extracted or abstracted part of the friend that Dasein carries with it, neither near nor far, neither in nor outside of it, neither in the ear, however "inner," nor outside the ear, is not just any part of the friend. It is what can permit evocation in general, to wit, the voice. What is evoked in this furtive or fleeting but doubtless decisive evocation is a vocation, indeed a call within self [en moi], Ruf or rather Stimme that will then be able to compose with all sorts of possibilities (einstimmen, Einstimmigkeit, Stimmung, Bestimmung, Übereinstimmung, Verstimmen, Verstimmtheit, Verstimmung). Besides, a little earlier (SZ, § 29), analyzing Die existenziale Konstitution des Da and Das Da-sein als Befindlichkeit, Heidegger devotes long and keen analyses to Gestimmtheit and to the fact that in Gestimmtheit it is always already according to the dimension of a Stimmung that Dasein is disclosed (erschlossen) as the being [étant] that is in its being delivered over (überannvortet, handed over, abandoned) as the being that has, in existing, to be (SZ 134—35). Since it is going to be a question of the friend and of friendship, and since I do not know yet what name to accord what some will be tempted to call a feeling, sentiment, affect, passion, or πάθη, it is necessary to begin by recalling the connection between Befindlichkeit (a word for which no good translation exists: "state of mind," "disposition," "disposibilité," "affection"), the tonality of Stimmung, the being-delivered-over of Überantwortung and the being-thrown of Geworfenheit. As Heidegger recalls (SZ, § 29, p. 137), Befindlichkeit is not a state of the soul, a psychic quality that would then be projected onto things or persons. Since the little phrase on the voice of the friend belongs to a long analysis of Mitsein in the modalities of Mitteilung, Mitverstehen, and Mitbefindlichkeit, nothing that concerns the friend would come under then a psychology, no more than a social science or human science in general, indeed an anthropology. It is Dasein and not ψυχή, man, self, nor subject, conscious or unconscious, that carries the friend in its voice or rather in hearing this voice.


Since the convention or the contract (in any case, the suggestion of John Sallis) wants me to privilege here a certain rapport of Heideggerian thought to the Greek tradition, I shall underscore three traits concerning Aristotle.

First, Heidegger refuses to determine Befindlichkeit as the place of affects or feelings, at least in the psychological sense of the term. And he then refers positively (SZ, § 29, p. 138) to the fact that Aristotle has not studied the πάθη in a psychology but in a rhetoric, a rhetoric itself understood as a hermeneutic, "the first systematic hermeneutic of the everydayness of Miteinandersein." It is in the same chapter that Heidegger mentions just as positively the tradition of Scheler, which goes back to Augustine and Pascal: one has access to the truth or to knowledge on the basis of love or charity and not the reverse (SZ 139).

And yet, <ι>second, everything that in this evocation of the friend depends on an analytic of Sprache and λόγος comes immediately after and thus supposes a critique or rather a "destruction" of the Aristotelian interpretation of λόγος. In the conclusions of the immediately preceding chapter (SZ, § 33, p. 159), Heidegger regrets that Aristotle's first phenomenological impulse in the analysis of λόγος was interrupted or broken to become a simple theory of judgment, of connection or separation of representations and concepts. Among other things, this means that everything in the future that will articulate, in an essential way, in Heidegger's thought λέγειν or λόγος and φιλεῖν will claim to come back to a pre-Aristotelian, in truth, a pre-Platonic, hearing of λόγος. Not only does the evocation of the voice of the friend follow a critique of the Aristotelian limit in the interpretation of λόγος, but it will also be followed by an analogous reservation (SZ 165) about the definition of man as animal rationale, ζῷον λόγον ἔχον, a definition that, Heidegger says, is not false but covers over or dissimulates the phenomenal ground from which this definition of Dasein is uprooted. This double reservation regarding Aristotle does not prevent Heidegger from defining the voice of the friend in such a way that only the opening of a Dasein is up to it. Dasein being the essence of man then is not contradictory to the Aristotelian proposal according to which there is friendship par excellence (πρώτη φιλία or τέλεια φιλία) only between men: not between gods and men, not between animal and man, not between gods, not between animals. On this point, Heidegger would remain Aristotelian: Dasein alone has a friend, Dasein alone can carry it bei sich, man alone as Dasein pricks up, opens, or lends an ear to the voice of the friend, since this voice is what permits Dasein to open itself to its own potentiality-for-being. The animal has no friend, man has no friendship properly so called for the animal. The animal that is "world poor," that has neither language nor experience of death, etc., the animal that has no hand, the animal that has no friend, has no ear either, the ear capable of hearing and of carrying the friend that is also the ear that opens Dasein to its own potentiality-for-being and that, as we will hear in a moment, is the ear of being, the ear for being.

The difference between animal and Dasein passes there again through the possibility of the "as such" (als) and of understanding or comprehending (entendre, Verstehen). Elsewhere I have tried to problematize Heidegger's analyses in this place. I shall underscore and generalize here only this remark: whether a matter of the hand, of feet, eye, sex, or ear, the Heideggerian phenomenology of Dasein's body, in what is more original and more necessary in that phenomenology, supposes precisely the phenomenological as such or the phenomenological "as such." The structural difference between Dasein and non-Dasein, for example the animal, is the difference between a being open to the as such and a being that is not, and therefore is "weltarm," world poor. In one stroke [Du coup], the voice of the friend, and consequently friendship in general, gives itself to be heard and understood [entendre] only in the phenomenological space of the "as such." No friendship outside a world in which "Verstehen" and phenomenology are possible. And the animal, if something like that existed that had some unity, will have no ear. No ear capable of hearing.

Nevertheless, third, the very moment he confirms this Aristotelian philosopheme, Heidegger clearly intends to return to a pre-Aristotelian, indeed pre-Platonic, hearing of λόγος, that is to say, to an experience of φιλεῖν more originary than that of the Platonico-Aristotelian φιλία. What does this claim signify? Up to what point is it sustained? It is surprising, yet all the more significant, that Heidegger often speaks of φιλεῖν but practically never names φιλία; and when, for example in the seminar of 1943—44 on Heraclitus, he does so, translating φιλία by Gunst, Plato and Aristotle, the great philosophers of φιλία, will not even be evoked.

Neither friendship nor φιλία are expressly named, it seems to me, in Sein und Zeit, in particular in the little phrase around which we are circling. Heidegger does not speak of friendship, of the concept or the general essence of friendship, but of the friend, of someone, of a Dasein in the singular whose voice alone (a partial object, perhaps a psychoanalyst would say) opens in a way the hearing of Dasein.

Why and how does it "open" Dasein? No doubt because a voice of the other, the other itself, is carried by every Dasein thus "bei sich," not in it, nor outside it, but "bei sich." The order of the existential analytic here is the following: no discourse (Rede) without (hearing) understanding [entendre], in the sense first of comprehension (Verstehen, Verständlichkeit), no understanding agreement [entente] or Verstehen without hearing (Hören). Hearing is constitutive of discourse, but does not consist in an acoustic phenomenon of the physiopsychological order; hearing has no need of the "inner" or "outer" ear in the organic sense of the term. Hearing is the "primary and authentic opening of Dasein for its ownmost potentiality-for-being (Das Hören konstituiert sogar die primäre und eigentliche Öffenheit des Daseins für sein eigenstes Seinkönnen)" (SZ 163). What the ear is, the essence and the destination of Dasein's ear, will be understood starting from this Hören, and not the inverse. And Heidegger names the hearing of the voice of the friend in the same phrase, in order to make explicit [expliciter] this opening of Dasein to its ownmost, its most authentic potentiality-for-being. If hearing the friend's voice constitutes Dasein's opening to its ownmost potentiality-for-being, that means there is no Dasein without it, no properness, indeed no self-proximity of Dasein without this "bei Sich Tragen" of the different other, of the other-different as friend but of the other. Dasein has an ear and can hear then only insofar as Dasein carries "bei sich" the friend, the voice of the friend. No ear without friend. No friend without ear.

Dasein's opening to its ownmost potentiality-for-being, as hearing the voice of the other as friend, is absolutely originary. This opening does not come under a psychology, a sociology, an anthropology, an ethics, or a politics, etc. The voice of the other friend, of the other as friend, the ear that I prick up to it, is the condition of my own-proper-being. But this voice nevertheless defines the figure of an originary sharing [partage] and an originary belonging, of a Mitteilen or of everything that is, as Heidegger says in this passage, "shared" (geteilt [SZ 164]) with the other in the Mitsein of discourse, of address and response. Shared [commune] belonging, in difference, is immediately inscribed, like a kind of originary socius, in what passes, through the ear, from Hören, hearing, to Hörigkeit as obedient listening—the other-friend, the other as friend being there already, its voice at least already having sounded, as if it dictated a kind of law the moment Dasein comes to its own potentiality-for-being—and to Gehörigkeit, to belonging. There would not be any properness, any proper potentiality-for-being of Dasein without this voice of the other-friend yet so difficult to situate in the topology of its "comportment," so to speak, in what it carries with it, in it outside it, in its "bei Sich tragen," that is, "in" or "with" a certain ear for which the distinction between inside and outside is so unheimlich. Dasein hears (hört) because it can comprehend or hear, entendre, in the sense of understand (verstehen). As understanding being-in-the-world (In-der-Welt-sein) with the other (mit den Anderen), Dasein listens to ("hörig"; a word that Heidegger leaves between quotation marks to underscore the play from hearing/listening as "hören" to listening to as obedience, indeed submission or subjection). And in this obedient listening (Hörigkeit), there is indeed Dasein's belonging: Dasein is from then on "zugehörig," belongs already to what could be called the belonging or sharing of the community ("Als verstehendes In-der-Welt-sein mit den Anderen ist es dem Mitdasein und ihm selbst 'hörig' und in dieser Hörigkeit zugehörig" [SZ 163]: As understanding being-in-the-world with the other, it [Dasein] is attentively or obediently listening to Mitdasein and itself. And in this obedient listening it belongs, or it is partner, it participates or shares).

But what I am anxious to insist on, before provisionally leaving this inexhaustible paragraph, is that this singular friend that every Dasein carries and hears "bei sich," no more represents friendship in general than it is necessarily friendly. The voice is not friendly, first because it is the voice of the friend, of someone, of an other Dasein responding to the question "who?" What defines the "voice of the friend," then, is not a quality, the friendly characteristic, but a belonging. But because this voice is not necessarily friendly, one ought not conclude for all that that the voice of this friend is neuter or neutral. Why? The voice of the friend is not reduced to the phoneme or to the acoustic phenomenon, does not merge with the noise perceived by an animal ear or auditory organ. This voice is an essentially understandable voice, the possibility of speech or discourse. It is essentially marked, like everything found at the opening of Dasein, by a certain Stimmung and by Befindlichkeit. It has then a tonality or a modality that one would call, in a language not very Heideggerian, affective. But here this voice says nothing determined. Heidegger lends it no remark. Nor as voice is it, regarding essentials, a kind of witness, that eye of conscience that accompanies, keeps watch over, and oversees, if at least the perceptive, visual, and cognitive, indeed theoretical connotation of attestation or testament is valued. But if it is not an eye of conscience, it is not either the inner voice of conscience, for this voice is not interior. One would not be able to pose on this subject questions of a critical or deconstructive type that recourse to the monologue or to the purely inner voice of the ego in Husserl's Logical Investigations could call for. Here there is no phenomenon of ideal self-presence in the inner voice. It is really a matter of the voice of the other.

One of the most difficult questions in deciphering this paragraph is a question that can just as well be qualified as logical, rhetorical, philological, indeed poetic. It concerns the status of this allusion to the voice of the friend in the demonstrative chain of the paragraph and finally step by step in the chain of the chapter and the book. A philological or poetic question: if the voice of the friend is only one example among others of the "bei sich tragen" of the other by every Dasein, is there behind this example a kind of more or less poetic τόπος, a quasi-citation? Even if, as is unfortunately my case for the moment, I cannot recognize the literal detail of a very determined citation, one can always think of a τόπος rather current, not only in everyday language but in numerous literatures that will have, under one form or another, named a "voice of the friend." Even if there is no hidden citation, in the strict sense of the word "citation," Heidegger doubtless makes at least a kind of virtual reference to current expressions, "the voice of the friend," the "bei Sich tragen," recurrent expressions, allusions to a τόπος, but justly to underscore the enigmatic and necessary character of the τόπος, of the place to which this τόπος refers, to wit, a voice that is situated neither inside nor out of Dasein, neither near nor far, a voice that participates as it were in the opening of the Da-, of Da-sein, and that takes the exemplary form of a voice, in the very absence of the voice's carrier. This response to the question that I called, for want of anything better, philological or poetic leaves it unsolved and even relaunches the question of the exemplarity of this example. Why would the voice of the friend be a better example of this situation, of this topology of Da-sein? One definitely understands the necessity to take up the example of a voice of the other in a chapter entitled Da-sein und Rede. Die Sprache. But why a "voice of the friend"? Why not the enemy? The lover? The father, the mother, the brother, or the sister, the son or the daughter or so many other figures still, all also "speaking"? Everything happens as if the friend were not one figure among others, and therefore could play an exemplary role for being the figureless [le sans-figure], or as is said in French le figurant or similarly in English, the figure-head, that individual being no one can be anyone, the exemplary, then at once singular and general, configuration of every possible other, of every possible figure, or rather of every possible voice of the other. Every voice of the other is in some way the voice of the friend, figured by the voice of the friend for Dasein. For Dasein alone can and must have a friend that speaks. Dasein alone has an ear for the friend that speaks.

Here is imposed on me a logicorhetorical dimension of the same question, the question of exemplarity. After the evocation of the friend, when Heidegger speaks of "Aufeinander-hören," of listening-to-one-another in general, has the friend been only one example among others (and then why this example rather than another or than the contrary example)? Or else does Heidegger also speak of the other as the voice of the friend, such that the exemplarity functions here in another sense, not in the sense of the example among other possible examples, but of the exemplarity that gives to be read and carries in itself all the figures of Mitdasein as Aufeinander-hören? All the figures of Mitsein would be figures of the friend, even if they were secondarily unfriendly or indifferent. The internal structure of chainings in this short paragraph does not seem to me to permit by itself alone deciding between the two hypotheses. Rather, if I orient myself toward the second, that is because a larger context, the one I am now going to try to recognize, seems to indicate that for Heidegger φιλεῖν, on the nonpsychological, nonanthropological, nonethicopolitical plane of the existential analytic and above all of the question of being or φύσις, welcomes within itself, in its very accord, many other modes than that of friendliness, but as well opposition, tension, confrontation, rejection, indeed, we will come to this, if not war, at least Kampf or πόλεμος. And it seems reasonable to think that Heidegger still speaks of the other as the voice of the friend when, immediately after the evocation of that voice, he concludes his paragraph in this way: "Listening to one another, which constitutes Mitsein, has for possible forms: following (Folgen), accompanying (Mitgehen), the negative modes of not-hearing (des Nicht-Hörens), of opposition (des Widersetzens), of defying (des Trotzens), of turning away (der Abkehr)" (SZ 163). In the hypothesis I am going to follow, these negative modes could still determine the hearing of the voice of the friend. To be opposed to the friend, to turn away from it, to defy it, to not hear it, that is still to hear and keep it, to carry with self, bei Sich tragen, the voice of the friend.

Consequently, if one still goes no further than Sein und Zeit, than so to speak the premises of the course I would like to sketch, one can say that there is neither opposition nor contradiction between what is said of the voice of the friend as exemplar of Mitsein as Aufeinander-hören and what is said near the end of the book about struggle (combat, Kampf) as the essential form of Miteinandersein, of community (Gemeinschaft), and of the people (Volk). That is because the voice of the friend does not exclude opposition, because it does not oppose itself to the opposition that there is no essential opposition between φιλεῖν and Kampf or, as will be said later, πόλεμος.

Before leaving Sein und Zeit, I would like to situate around the word Kampf not only a motif that does not at all contradict the evocation of the friend's voice as the opening of Dasein as Mitsein, but on the contrary, prolonging it, announces very precisely the thematization so insistent of struggle (Streit, πόλεμος, and above all Kampj) in the Rectorate Discourse (1933) and in the Introduction to Metaphysics (1935). Section 74 of Sein und Zeit (Die Grundveffassung der Geschichtlichkeit), which, once more, makes explicit Dasein's own proper potentiality-for-being, would call for a long and meticulous reading. I retain from it one single trait. Compared to sharing or communication (Mitteilung) and on the same level, to the same degree, struggle (Kampf) is how the power (Macht) of destiny (Geschickes) is set free. This destiny (Geschick) is here the Geschehen of Dasein as Mitgeschehen, the historiality of or as being-with. The Geschehen, the historial event, so to speak, that of which historiality is made, to wit, Geschichtlichkeit whose fundamental constitution Heidegger analyzes here, is common or shared historiality under the form of community (Gemeinschafi) and the people (Volk). The common destiny of the community or the people sets free its power (Macht) in the sharing, the communication (Mitteilung), to be sure, but also both quite as much and quite as originarily, in the struggle (Kampf). This power that is thus set free in the common or shared struggle is also superpower (Übermacht), namely, the movement of a finite freedom that assumes, in the impact [tranchant] of a choice (Wahl), the nonpower (die Ohnmacht) of the turning away or of the being-turned-away (Überlassenheit). The motif of choice (Wahl) is at once indissociable from that of resolution, of authenticity of resolution or decision (Eigentlichkeit der Entschlossenheit [SZ 383]), but also of heritage (Erbe). Dasein, as it throws itself by anticipation toward death, inherits and chooses. The inherited possibility is at the same time chosen (aber gleichwohl gewählten Möglichkeit überliefert [SZ 384]).

All these possibilities—choice, tradition both inherited and chosen, authentic resolution also determined, in the same chapter (SZ 383), as the "projecting of oneself toward one's own being-guilty [or being-liable, being-accountable]—a project that keeps silent and is ready for anxiety (das verschwiegene, angstbereite Sichentwerfen auf das eigene Schuldigsein)" (SZ 385)—all that is at once historial, because shared in the being-together or with-one-another, in Miteinandersein, but also shared in the struggle and as struggle (Kampf). And so, just like "the voice of the friend," Kampf belongs to the very structure of Dasein. It belongs to its historial structure and thus, this must also be explicitly stated, to the subjectivity of the historial subject. For let, us not forget what question announces section 74 on "The fundamental constitution of historiality (Die Grundveffassung der Geschichtlichkeit)":

to what extent and on the basis of what ontological conditions does historiality belong, as an essential constitution, to the subjectivity of the "historial" subject? (inwiefern und auf Grund welcher ontologischen Bedingungen gehört zur Subjektivität des "geschichtlichen" Subjekts die Geschichtlichkeit als Wesensverfassung?) (SZ 382; Heidegger's emphasis)

This section resonates historically in both the most acute and serious way with what is announced or found in gestation in Germany and Europe from 1927 to 1933. This resonance is not necessarily a consonance or a correspondence and remains to be interpreted. But in any case the discourse that is organized around Volk and Kampf, in Sein und Zeit, but also and above all in the Rectorate Discourse (1933) and in the Introduction to Metaphysics (1935), is not at all contradictory to the evocation of the friend's voice some 220 pages earlier, although, to my knowledge once again, those are the only two occurrences of the word Freund4 and the word Kampf in Sein und Zeit. No contradiction, no opposition, I was saying, and first because opposition itself, but also resistance, disobedience, insubordination (Widersetzen) are described as essential possibilities of "listening-to-one-another" (Aufeinander-hören), of faithful or docile hearing (Hörigkeit), and of belonging (Zugehörigkeit), in which remains exemplary the hearing of the voice of the friend that each Dasein bei Sich trägt.

If the voice of the friend, and then the reference to the friend, is as essential to Dasein's own-proper-being qua Mitsein as are the community, the people, and struggle (Kampf), it is no doubt logical to conclude from this that there is no friend that is not itself Dasein responding in return to the same description and the same conditions: no friend outside of the possibility of speaking, hearing [entendre], entering the Miteinander of Auseinandersetzung, no friend outside of belonging to a community and to a people (Volk). It is not entirely excluded, nor is it certain that belonging to the same community or to the same people, the experience of the same tongue, or the participation in the same struggle is the requisite condition for a voice of the friend to be carried bei Sich by Dasein. That is not certain, no doubt it is excluded by the analysis of hearing (Hören) and of the pricked-up ear (Horchen) that immediately follows the evocation of the friend's voice. To prick up the ear is not to hear auditory sensations and noises, sonorous complexes, acoustic phenomena that could give rise to a psychology. No, we prick up our ear toward what is beyond the ear, the open ear, over there, in the world, beside [aupres de] what is for example usable in the world (again the expression bei, this time underscored: beim innerweltlich Zuhandenen) or beside what is heard [entendu]. We do not hear hearing but the heard and then what is understood: Dasein is essentially what hears in understanding, that is, in being beside what is heard in the sense of understood (beim Verstandenen) (SZ 164). It is by this, by the opening, the ear's opening, the opening of Dasein to its own proper potentiality-for-being. and the opening of the ear as Dasein's ear, it is by this, through the ear, that Dasein carries the voice of the friend bei sich, but that it also carries itself beside [auprés des] things in the world and first beside what is heard and understood (beim innerweltlich Zuhandenen or beim Verstandenen). All the enigma of this topics of Dasein's ear and of the Da of Sein passes through this semantics of the bei, of, this beside, this auprés de whose vicinity is neither the very close nor the infinitely distant.

Heidegger gives some rather interesting examples of what is heard and under- stood when we prick up our ear and when, from then on, beyond the acoustic phenomenon and noise, we are by, beside (bei), what is outside us. These examples are of two orders: on the one hand, things that are in the world as "innerweltlich Zuhandenen," and on the other hand, the discourse of the other. The first series associates modern technomilitary themes (the creaking wagon [den knarrenden Wagen], the motorcycle, the marching column [die Kolonne auf dem Marsch] [SZ 163—64], then again the motorcycle and still the wagon) and nontechnological but no less significant themes (the north wind, the crackling fire, the woodpecker tapping the tree). Concerning the discourse of the other, we are in advance with the other (that is to say, outside ourselves) beside the being (bei dem Seienden) (SZ 164) on which the discourse bears [porte], even if we do not understand what the other says, even if the other speaks a foreign tongue, even if we hear unintelligible (unverständliche) words: this unintelligibility, for example, that of a foreign tongue, does not prevent us from understanding that we are dealing with an intelligible language that bears on the beings beside which Dasein can stand. This remark permits one to think that the voice of the friend whose originary and constitutive character we have analyzed must doubtless speak a language [langue] and belong to a Volk, but through this voice the tongue of a foreign people can be spoken. The friend can be a stranger, but like all Dasein it belongs to a community and a people, is engaged in a history, a Geschehen that is a Mitgeschehen, and in a struggle. Like every voice, and thus like every ear, those of the friend.



NOTES

1. G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik 2, vol. 6 of Werke in zwanzig Bänden (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1969), 573; Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1989 [1969]), 843 (modified).

2. See Christopher Fynsk, Heidegger, Thought and Historicity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986), 42—43; Jean-Francois Courtine, "Voix de la conscience et vocation de l'étre," Cahiers Confrontation 20 (Winter 1989): 82; and Jean-Luc Nancy, "La décision d'éxistence," in "Etre et temps" de Heidegger (Marseilles: Sud, 1989), 239.

3. Although Heidegger in outline gives the understanding that Ereignis is not a mode of being, he puts us on guard against this simple "inversion (Umkehrung)" of the logical order, which would still be a "flight," a "refuge" (Zuflucht). The relations of the logical order here have no pertinence since we are trying to think the very origin of logic and ontologic. See SD 22—23; TB 2122.

4. Since this lecture was written and delivered, my friend Maurizio Ferraris has pointed out to me another occurrence of the word "friend." In a certain way, it can be judged to be without great import [portée], in any case, without a common measure with the occurrence occupying us here. This occurrence in effect seems lost in another demonstrative space, in a series of examples in which the friend could easily be replaced by another figure without damaging the sense. The arrival of a friend (die Ankunft eines Freundes) is invoked there as an example of impending events in a series concerning Vorhandensein (a storm), Zuhandensein (the renovation of a house), as well as Mitdasein (the arrival of a friend): "For instance, a storm, the remodeling of the house, or the arrival of a friend, may be impending; and these are entities which are respectively present -at-hand, ready-to-hand, and there-with-us (Bevorstehen kann zum Beispiel ein Gewitter, der Umbau des Hauses, die Ankunft eines Freundes, Seiendes demnach, was vorhanden, zuhanden Oder mit-da-ist)" (SZ, § 50, p. 250). It is justifiable and indispensable to dissociate this allusion to the impending coming of the friend from the allusion to the voice of the friend, the latter of having a different status and seriousness as the former. But once that was done, once the coming of the friend, one example among others, was opposed to the exemplary voice of the friend, one could nevertheless be tempted to charge this apparently contingent example with a troubling, indeed unheimlich (uncanny), signification. For the imminence Heidegger analyzes here and that he justly wants to distinguish, in all rigor, from other imminences, like that of the storm, of the renovating of the house, or of the coming of the friend , is nothing other than the imminence of death. It is a matter of distinguishing the imminence, the "not yet" of death from every other imminence. This contextual proximity obliges one to ask why the example of the arrival of the friend has been imposed on Heidegger the moment he treated in sum of the always impending arrival of death. Without citing this text, without even letting it be thought that he had paid attention to it, Christopher Fynsk, in Heidegger, Thought and Historicity, evokes the voice of the friend in a context in which he chooses to associate it with the death of Dasein, as if, in its very silence, the voice of the friend announced to Dasein its own proper death: "In its silence, the voice of the friend," Fynsk says, "speaks to Dasein of its death" (p. 43).

And yet however tempting and perhaps justified this reading may be, it cannot act on the authority of the allusion to the impending coming of the friend—and that is why, whether he had remarked it or not, Fynsk was right not to refer to this to back up his reading. For Heidegger puts us on guard against an assimilation between the imminence of death and the imminence of such an arrival. The passage I just cited closes thus: "Ein Sein dieser Art hat der bevorstehende Tod nicht": "The death which impends does not have this kind of Being."

That said, every association, every "logic" does not reduce itself to the association and the "logic" prescribed by a rigorous reading of argumentation, of conceptual and seman- tic linkings in a context regulated by meaning. Heidegger clearly explains to us how and why, if one comprehends what he means (to say), one must not put on the same plane the example of the impending arrival of a friend and the imminence of death. But the choice of examples can be read beyond that meaning. This supposes a completely other protocol of reading, an other logic, an other rhetoric, a hermeneutic not only broadened but restructured by taking into account what would be called, to go quickly and in a word doubtless problematic, the "unconscious." While belonging to a rigorously heterogeneous sphere and from which one comprehends that Heidegger is anxious to distinguish it, the examples chosen have a certain type of affinity, an unquestionable relation of magnetizing with the imminence, the dread, or the anticipation of death, such as an existential analytic can describe it. This magnetizing, this law of attraction whose status remains to be defined, concerns the example of the friend's coming, but also the other two, the storm (Gewitter) or the topsy-turvy transformation (Umbau) of the house. They are not just any examples. No doubt the discourse that guides the analytic of Dasein no longer depends, in its axiomatics, on a philosophy of consciousness. But does not that discourse still resist that "logic" or that "law" that we associate here with the old word "unconscious" and that is withdrawn, that in any case we withdraw, in a fashion not very Heideggerian, I believe, from the authority of intentional meaning? Without coming under a metaphysics of con- sciousness, is not the Heideggerian analytic of Dasein, however, regulated by the norms of an absolute intentional meaning? Such at least is the stake of this remark.


Jacques Derrida - Geschlecht IV Heidegger's Ear part 1
Ereignis