despite this debt to Heidegger's thought, or rather because of it, I attempt to locate in Heidegger's text--which, no more than any other, is not homogeneous, continuous, everywhere equal to the greatest force and to all the consequences of its questions--the signs of a belonging to metaphysics, or to what he calls ontotheology. Moreover, Heidegger recognizes that economically and strategically he had to borrow the syntaxic and lexical resources of the language of metaphysics, as one always must do at the very moment that one deconstructs this language. Therefore we must work to locate these metaphysical holds, and to reorganize unceasingly the form and sites of our questioning. Now, among these holds, the ultimate determination of difference as the ontico-ontological difference--however necessary and decisive this phase may be--still seems to me, in a strange way, to be in the grasp of metaphysics. Perhaps then, moving along lines that would be more Nietzschean than Heideggerean, by going to the end of this thought of the truth of Being, we would have to become open to a différance that is no longer determined, in the language of the West, as the difference between Being and beings. Such a departure is doubtless not possible today, but one could show how it is in preparation. In Heidegger, first of all. Différance--fourth--therefore would name provisionally this unfolding of difference, in particular, but not only, or first of all, of the ontico-ontological difference.