which also means, for Heidegger, in a psychoanalytic fashion. Beyond the esthetico-psychoanalytic , this trace of the tragic calls us to thinking, on the basis of the interpretation of the Being of being, the διδόναι δίκην . . . τῆς άδικίας.23 What is this gift of the Δίκη? What is this justice beyond right? Does it come along simply to compensate a wrong, restitute something due, to do right or do justice? Does it come along simply to render justice or, on the contrary, to give beyond the due, the debt, the crime, or the fault? Does it come simply to repair injustice (άδικία) or more precisely to rearticulate as must be the disjointure of the present time ("to set it right" as Hamlet said)?

The disjointure in the very presence of the present, this sort of non-contemporaneity of present time with itself (this radical untimeliness or this anachrony on the basis of which we are trying here to think the ghost) is, according to Heidegger, "said and not said" by the fragment of Anaximander.24

A. To be sure, it says "without equivocation" (eindeutig) that the present (das Anwesende), as present, is in άδικία, that is, as Heidegger translates,25 deranged, off its hinges, out of joint (aus der Fuge). The present is what passes, the present comes to pass [se passe], it lingers in this transitory passage (Weile), in the coming-and-going, between what goes and what comes, in the middle of what leaves and what arrives, at the articulation between what absents itself and what presents itself. This in-between articulates conjointly the double articulation (die Fuge) according to which the two movements are adjoined (gefügt). Presence (Anwesen) is enjoined (verfugt), ordered, distributed in the two directions of absence, at the articulation of what is no longer and what is not yet. To join and enjoin. This thinking of the jointure is also a thinking of injunction.

B. And yet, declaring this "without equivocation, the Spruch also says something else—or it only says this on condition. It would name the disjointure (άδικία) or the "injustice" of the present only in order to say that it is necessary διδόναι δίκην. (The duty or the debt of the "it is necessary" is perhaps excessive, even if Nietzsche translates: Sie müssen Busze zahlen, they must pay penalty.) In any case, it is clearly a matter of giving, of giving Δίκη. Not of rendering justice, to render it in return by means of punishment, payment, or expiation, as one most often translates (Nietzsche and Diels). There is first of all a gift without restitution, without calculation, without accountability. Heidegger thus removes such a gift from any horizon of culpability, of debt, of right, and even, perhaps, of duty. He would especially like to wrest it away from that experience of vengeance whose idea, he says , remains "the opinion of those who

23 Holzwege, p. 330; Early Greek Thinking, p. 44.
24 "Er sagt es und sagt es nicht," Holzwege, p. 328; Early Greek Thinking, p. 42.
25 Holzwege, p. 327; Early Greek Thinking, p. 41.