proper to him (ihm eignet) and gives him presence. If one still translates Dikē with this word "justice," and if, as Heidegger does, Dikē is thought on the basis ofBeing as presence, then it would turn out that "justice" is first of all, and finally, and especially properly, the jointure of the accord: the proper jointure to the other given by one who does not have it. Injustice would be the disjointure or disjoining (let us quote again: "Dikē, aus dem Sein als Anwesen gedacht, ist der fugend-fügende Fug. Adikia, die Un-Fuge, ist der Un-Fug").

This is where our question would corne in. Has not Heidegger, as he always does, skewed the asymmetry in favor of what hein effect interprets as the possibility of favor itself, of the accorded favor, namely, of the accord that gathers or collects while harmonizing (Versammlung, Fug), be it in the sameness of differents or of disagreements [différends], and before the synthesis of a sys-tem? Once one has recognized the force and the necessity of thinking justice on the basis of the gift, that is, beyond right, calculation, and commerce, once one has recognized therefore the necessity (without force, precisely [justement], without necessity, perhaps, and without law) of thinking the gift to the other as gift of that which one does not have and which thus, paradoxically, can only come back or belong to the other, is there not a risk of inscribing this whole movement of justice under the sign of presence, be it of the presence to meaning of the Anwesen, of the event as coming into presence, of Being as presence joined to itself, of the proper of the other as presence? As the presence of the received present, yes, but appropriable as the same and therefore gathered together? Beyond right, and still more beyond juridicism, beyond morality, and still more beyond moralism, does not justice as relation to the other suppose on the contrary the irreducible excess of a disjointure or an anachrony, some Un-Fuge, some "out of joint" dislocation in Being and in rime itself, a disjointure that, in always risking the evil, expropriation, and injustice (adikia) against which there is no calculable insurance, would alone be able to do justice or to render justice to the other as other? A doing that would not amount only to action and a rendering that would not come down just to restitution? To put it too quickly and to formalize in the extreme the stakes: here, in this interpretation of the Un-Fug (whether or not it is on the basis ofBeing as presence and the property of the proper), would be played out the relation of deconstruction to the possibility of justice, the relation of deconstruction (insofar as it proceeds from the irreducible possibility of the Un-Fug and the anachronic disjointure, insofar as it draws from there the very resource and injunction