that-which-regions is this: human nature is given over to truth, because truth needs man. Yet now the distinguishing characteristic of truth—particularly in its relation to man—is, is it not, to be what it is independent of man?
Scholar: Here indeed you touch upon a difficulty we can discuss only after we have explained the nature of truth as such, and have more clearly determined the nature of man.
Teacher: Now we are but on our way to both. Nevertheless, in order to make clearer what we have to reflect upon if we consider this relation by itself, I would like to paraphrase the statement about the relation of truth to man.
Scientist: For the present, then, what you are to say about it will be an assertion only.
Teacher: Assuredly, and I mean this: the nature of man is released to that-which-regions and used by it accordingly, for this reason alone—that man of himself has no power over truth and it remains independent of him. Truth's nature can come forth independently of man only because the nature of man (as releasement to that-which- regions) is used by that-which-regions in regioning both with respect to man and to sustain determining. Evidently truth's independence from man is a relation to human nature, a relation which rests on the regioning of human nature into that-which-regions.
Scholar: If this were so, then man, as in-dwelling in releasement to that-which-regions, would abide in the origin of his nature, which in consequence we may paraphrase: man is he who is made use of for the nature of