That with respect to the ἐθέλει the οὐκ is designated first suggests that the Ἓν does not properly admit of being named Zeus, and of being thereby degraded to the level of existing as one being present among others—even if the "among" has the character of "above all other present beings."

On the other hand, according to the saying, the Ἓν does admit of being named Zeus. How? The answer is already contained in what has just been said. If the Ἓν is not apprehended as being by itself the Λόγος, if it appears rather as the Πάντα, then and only then does the totality of present beings show itself under the direction of the highest present being as one totality under this [unifying] One. The totality of present beings is under its highest aspect the Ἓν as Zeus. The Ἓν itself, however, as Ἓν Πάντα, is the Λόγος, the Laying that gathers. As Λόγος, the Ἓν alone is τὸ Σοφόν, the fateful as Fate itself: the gathering of destiny into presence.

If the ἀκούειν of mortals is directed to Λόγος alone, to the Laying that gathers, then mortal λέγειν is skillfully brought to the gathering of the Λόγος. Mortal λέγειν lies secured in the Λόγος. It is destined to be appropriated in ὁμολογεῖν. Thus it remains appropriated to the Λόγος. In this way mortal λέγειν is fateful. But it is never Fate itself, i.e. Ἓν Πάντα as ὁ Λόγος.

Now that the saying of Heraclitus speaks more clearly, what it says again threatens to fade into obscurity.

The Ἓν Πάντα indeed contains the clue to the way in which Λόγος in its λέγειν essentially occurs. Yet whether it is thought as "laying" or as "saying," does λέγειν forever remain merely a type of mortal behavior? If Ἓν Πάντα were the Λόγος, then would not a particular aspect of mortal being be elevated to become the fundamental trait of that which, as the destiny of presencing itself, stands above all mortal and immortal being? Does the Λόγος imply the elevation and transfer of the mortal's way-to-be to that of the unique One? Does mortal λέγειν remain only an image corresponding to the Λόγος, which is itself the Fate in which presencing as such and for all present beings rests?

Or does such questioning, which attaches itself to the guidelines of an Either-Or, not at all apply, because its approach is from the start inadequate to the inquiry here undertaken?