Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)

Simply through the fact that the duality on account of which mortals find themselves thinking, demands such thinking for itself.

We are still far from experiencing the duality itself—that is, at the same time, so far as it demands thinking—far from experiencing it in an essential way. Only one thing is clear from the saying of Parmenides: neither on account of ἐόντα, "beings in themselves," nor for the sake of εἶναι, "Being for itself," does thinking come to presence. That is to say: a "being in itself," does not make thinking mandatory, nor does "Being for itself' necessitate thought. Neither, taken separately, will ever let it be known to what extent "Being" calls for thinking. But because of their duality, because of the ἐόν, thinking comes to presence. The taking-heed of Being comes to presence on the way to the duality. In such a presencing thinking belongs to Being. What does Parmenides say about this belonging?


Parmenides says that νοεῖν πεφατισμένον ἐν τῷ ἐόντι. This is translated: "thinking, which as something uttered is in being." But how can we ever hope to experience and understand this being-uttered so long as we do not take the trouble to question what "utterance," "to speak," and "language" mean here, or so long as we hastily accept ἐόν as a being and let the meaning of Being remain undetermined? How can we ever come to recognize the connection of νοεῖν to πεφατισμένον so long as we do not adequately determine the νοεῖν by referring back to Fragment VI? (Cf. What is Called Thinking? pp. 203 ff.) Νοεῖν, whose belonging-together with ἐόν we should like to contemplate, is grounded in and comes to presence from λέγειν. In λέγειν the letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing occurs. Only as thus lying-before can what is present as such admit the νοεῖν, the taking-heed-of. Accordingly, the νόημα as νοούμενον of the νοεῖν is already a λεγόμενον of the λέγειν. In the Greek experience, the essence of saying rests in λέγειν. On that account νοεῖν is essentially—not peripherally or accidentally—something said. Certainly not everything said need be an utterance. It can also, and some times must, be a silence.