Moira (Parmenides VIII, 34-41)


But what becomes of the φάσις (saying) reigning in revealing destiny if this destiny should abandon what is unfolded in the twofold to the everyday perception of mortals? Mortals accept (δέχεσθαι, δόξα) whatever is immediately, abruptly, and first of all offered to them. They never concern themselves about preparing a path of thought. They never really hear the call of the disclosure of the duality. They keep to what is unfolded in the twofold, and only to that aspect which immediately makes a claim upon mortals; that is, they keep to what is present without considering presenting. They relinquish all their affairs to what is commonly assumed, τὰ δοκοΰντα (Frag. I, 31) . They take this to be what is unconcealed, ἀληθῆ (VIII, 39), for it really does appear to them and is thus something revealed. {GA 7: 259} But what becomes of their speech if it is not capable of being a λέγειν, a letting-lie-before? The ordinary speech of mortals, insofar as they do not consider presencing, that is, insofar as they do not think, ends up as a speaking of names in which vocalization and the immediately perceptible form of the word, as spoken or written, are stressed.

The unequivocal restriction of speech (of letting-lie-before) to word-signs shatters the gathering taking-heed-of. The latter now becomes κατατίθεσθαι (VIII, 39), establishing, which simply secures this or that as a hasty opinion. Everything, so secured remains ὄνομα. Parmenides is in no way saying that what is ordinarily assumed becomes a "mere" name. But what is thus assumed is given over to a speaking entirely guided by current terms which, rashly spoken, say everything about everything and wander aimlessly in the "... as well as ..."

Perception of what is present (of ἐόντα) also names εἶναι and knows presencing, although it knows nonpresencing just as fleetingly; of course, it does not know this in the same way as does thinking, which for its part is concerned with what is withheld from the duality (the μὴ ἐόν). Ordinary opinion knows only εἶναί τε καὶ οὐχί (VIII, 40), presencing as well as nonpresencing. The stress in this knowing falls on the τε-καί, the "as well as." And where ordinary perception, speaking in words, encounters rise and fall, it is satisfied with the "as well as" of coming-to-be, γίγνεσθαι [Entstehen], and passing away, ὄλλυσθαι [Vergehen]. It never perceives place, τόπος, as an abode, as what the twofold offers as a home to the presenting of what is present.


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Martin Heidegger (GA 7) Early Greek Thinking