| # | Greek | Latin | German | English | Notes |
| 1 | ἀλήθεια (alētheia) | veritas | Wahrheit | truth / unconcealment | ἀλήθεια originally means un‑hiddenness, the state in which beings emerge from concealment. Heidegger insists that the Latin veritas distorts this by reducing truth to correctness. For the early Greeks, ἀλήθεια names the event in which beings show themselves. It is not a property of propositions but a happening of Being. Heidegger reactivates this primordial sense to critique the history of metaphysics. |
| 2 | λόγος (logos) | ratio | Logos / Rede | gathering / saying | For the Presocratics, λόγος means the gathering that lets something appear as what it is. It is not primarily “speech” or “reason” but the structural articulation of Being. Heraclitus uses λόγος to name the underlying order of the cosmos. Heidegger interprets λόγος as legein, the gathering that lets beings lie before us. The Latin ratio narrows it into calculative reason. |
| 3 | φύσις (physis) | natura | Natur | emerging‑abiding sway | φύσις originally means the self‑emergence of beings into presence. It is not “nature” as a domain of objects but the dynamic unfolding of Being. Heidegger emphasizes that φύσις is the earliest Greek name for Being itself. It names the rising‑up and abiding of beings. Latin natura freezes this dynamic into a static category. |
| 4 | ὄν / τὰ ὄντα (on / ta onta) | ens / entia | Seiendes | beings | ὄν is the participle “being,” and τὰ ὄντα means “the beings” in their totality. Heidegger stresses that the Greeks did not yet distinguish “being” from “beings” in the later metaphysical sense. For Anaximander, τὰ ὄντα includes natural, human, divine, and artificial beings. Heidegger uses Seiendes to mark the ontic realm. The question of Being arises only when beings are seen as beings. |
| 5 | εἶναι (einai) | esse | Sein | to be / Being | εἶναι is the infinitive “to be,” but for the Greeks it names the event of presence. Heidegger argues that the Greeks experienced Being as presence (Anwesen). Latin esse transforms Being into a static property. Heidegger’s Sein attempts to retrieve the dynamic, temporal character of εἶναι. The forgetting of Being begins when εἶναι becomes a universal concept. |
| 6 | γένεσις (genesis) | generatio | Entstehen | emergence / presencing | γένεσις means the coming‑forth of beings into presence. It is not merely biological birth or physical origin. Heidegger interprets γένεσις as the event of presencing (Anwesen). In Anaximander, γένεσις is paired with φθορά as two modes of Being’s temporal unfolding. Latin generatio narrows it to biological or causal production. |
| 7 | φθορά (phthora) | corruptio | Vergehen | withdrawal / departure | φθορά is usually translated as “decay,” but Heidegger hears it as the counter‑movement to γένεσις. It names the departure of beings from presence, their withdrawal into absence. This is not destruction but a necessary mode of Being’s temporal play. Latin corruptio moralizes and materializes the term. Heidegger links φθορά to Abwesen (absence). |
| 8 | χρεών (chreōn) | debitum / necessitas | das Notwendige | the must of Being | χρεών is often rendered “necessity,” but Heidegger interprets it as the inner “must” of Being’s unfolding. It is not a law imposed from outside but the essential requirement of presencing and absencing. In Anaximander, beings emerge and withdraw “according to the χρεών.” This expresses the inner lawfulness of Being itself. Latin necessitas distorts it into compulsion. |
| 9 | δίκη (dikē) | iustitia | Fuge / Fug | fittingness / jointure | δίκη is not moral justice but the fitting order of Being. Heidegger interprets δίκη as the jointure (Fug) that lets beings appear in their proper measure. It is the structural balance of presencing and absencing. In Anaximander, δίκη names the ontological order that governs beings. Latin iustitia moralizes the term. |
| 10 | ἀδικία (adikia) | iniustitia | Un‑Fug | dis‑measure / overstepping | ἀδικία is not moral wrongdoing but ontological overstepping. It names the tendency of beings to persist, dominate, or exceed their allotted measure. Heidegger interprets ἀδικία as the disturbance of δίκη. It is the imbalance inherent in beings’ striving to presence. Latin iniustitia reduces it to ethical fault. |
| 11 | τίσις (tisis) | poena / retributio | Ausgleich | re‑balancing / giving‑back | τίσις is usually translated as “penalty,” but Heidegger hears it as the restoring of balance. It is the counter‑movement that returns beings to their proper measure. In Anaximander, beings “give back” to one another for their overstepping. This is not punishment but ontological compensation. Latin poena moralizes it. |
| 12 | χρόνος (chronos) | tempus | Zeit | time as presencing | χρόνος is not clock‑time but the temporal stretching in which beings appear and withdraw. Heidegger interprets χρόνος as the ecstatic structure of presencing. It is the horizon that allows γένεσις and φθορά to occur. Latin tempus abstracts it into a measurable sequence. Heidegger’s Zeit retrieves its ontological depth. |
| 13 | τάξις (taxis) | ordo | Ordnung | ordering / articulation | τάξις means the ordering or arrangement that structures presencing. In Anaximander, “the τάξις of time” is the articulation of temporal unfolding. Heidegger interprets τάξις as the structural jointure of Being. It is not a law but an ordering. Latin ordo narrows it to hierarchical arrangement. |
| 14 | ἄπειρον (apeiron) | infinitum | das Unbegrenzte | the boundless | For Anaximander, ἄπειρον is the boundless source from which beings emerge. It is not infinite in the mathematical sense but without determinate limits. Heidegger interprets it as the primordial openness of Being. It is the origin that is not itself a being. Latin infinitum misleads by suggesting endless extension. |
| 15 | ἔρις (eris) | discordia | Streit | strife | Heraclitus uses ἔρις to name the productive tension that holds the cosmos together. It is not mere conflict but the dynamic interplay of opposites. Heidegger interprets ἔρις as the strife that constitutes world. It is the ontological tension that allows beings to appear. Latin discordia moralizes it. |
| 16 | πόλεμος (polemos) | bellum | Kampf | war / conflict as origin | Heraclitus calls πόλεμος “the father of all.” Heidegger interprets this not as literal war but as the primordial conflict that differentiates beings. It is the strife that sets limits and opens world. Polemos is the ontological event of differentiation. Latin bellum reduces it to military conflict. |
| 17 | μοῖρα (moira) | fatum | Geschick | destiny / allotment | μοῖρα means the portion or share allotted to each being. Heidegger links it to Geschick, the sending of Being. It is not fatalistic determinism but the structural distribution of presencing. In early Greek thought, μοῖρα governs measure. Latin fatum distorts it into predestination. |
| 18 | ἦθος (ēthos) | mos | Sitte | dwelling / character | ἦθος originally means dwelling place, the habitual abode. Heidegger retrieves this sense to interpret Heraclitus’ fragment “ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων.” Ethos is the place where human beings dwell in relation to Being. It is not moral character but existential dwelling. Latin mos moralizes it. |
| 19 | δαίμων (daimōn) | daemon | das Dämonische | the guiding spirit | δαίμων is not a demon but a divine‑human intermediary. For Heraclitus, it names the guiding force of one’s destiny. Heidegger interprets δαίμων as the way Being addresses a human being. It is the voice of destiny. Latin daemon later becomes associated with evil. |
| 20 | λόγος ὁμολογεῖν (logos homologein) | confessio | Zuspruch | attunement to the logos | ὁμολογεῖν means “to say the same as,” to be attuned to the λόγος. Heidegger interprets this as listening to the gathering of Being. It is not agreement but existential attunement. Heraclitus says most fail to ὁμολογεῖν. Latin confessio misses the ontological sense. |
| 21 | παρὼν / ἀπών (parōn / apōn) | praesens / absens | anwesend / abwesend | present / absent | These terms name modes of presencing. Heidegger uses them to show that Being is temporal. Presence is not static but an event. Absence is not non‑being but another mode of Being’s play. Latin praesens and absens flatten the dynamic. |
| 22 | ἔστι (esti) | est | ist | is | The simple verb “is” becomes the central question of Western metaphysics. Heidegger shows how Parmenides’ “ἐστίν” grounds the history of Being. The Greeks experienced “is” as presence. Latin est becomes a copula. Heidegger reopens the question of the “is.” |
| 23 | νοεῖν (noein) | intelligere | Vernehmen | to apprehend / to heed | For Parmenides, νοεῖν is the apprehension of Being. Heidegger interprets it as Vernehmen, a receptive heeding. It is not conceptual thinking but letting‑be. Latin intelligere intellectualizes it. Noein is the mode of access to Being. |
| 24 | λέγειν (legein) | dicere | sagen | to gather / to say | λέγειν originally means to gather, to lay out. Heidegger emphasizes this as the root of λόγος. Saying is gathering. Latin dicere reduces it to speaking. Heidegger retrieves the gathering sense. |
| 25 | ὁδός (hodos) | via | Weg | way / path | ὁδός means way or path. Parmenides’ poem is structured as a journey along the way of Being. Heidegger interprets ὁδός as the path of thinking. It is not a metaphor but the structure of access to Being. Latin via keeps some of this sense but loses the ontological depth. |
| 26 | ἄλη (alē) | verum | das Wahre | the true / the unconcealed | ἄλη is an older form related to ἀλήθεια, emphasizing the state of being unhidden. It names the primordial openness in which beings can appear. Heidegger sees in this root the earliest Greek experience of truth as unconcealment. It predates the propositional sense of truth. Latin verum shifts the meaning toward correctness. |
| 27 | ἔν (hen) | unum | Eins | the One | For Parmenides, ἔν names the unity of Being. It is not numerical oneness but the indivisible wholeness of presence. Heidegger interprets the One as the unifying event of Being. It is not a highest being but the unity of presencing. Latin unum misleads by suggesting a countable entity. |
| 28 | ἔστι γάρ εἶναι (esti gar einai) | est enim esse | denn Sein ist | for Being is | This Parmenidean phrase grounds Western ontology. It asserts that Being is, and non‑being is not. Heidegger interprets it as the primordial insight into the self‑showing of Being. It is not a logical axiom but an experiential disclosure. Latin est enim esse reduces it to a tautology. |
| 29 | μῦθος (mythos) | fabula | Sage | myth / saying | μῦθος originally means a significant saying or utterance. It is not opposed to λόγος in early Greek thought. Heidegger emphasizes that μῦθος is a mode of revealing. Only later does it become “myth” in the sense of fiction. Latin fabula contributes to this decline. |
| 30 | φύλαξ (phylax) | custos | Wächter | guardian | In Parmenides’ proem, the goddess is a guardian of the way of truth. Heidegger interprets φύλαξ as the one who keeps open the clearing of Being. It is not a mere protector but a preserver of unconcealment. Latin custos narrows it to a watchman. The term resonates with Heidegger’s idea of “the shepherd of Being.” |
| 31 | ἄνθρωπος (anthrōpos) | homo | Mensch | human being | ἄνθρωπος originally means the one who “looks up” or “faces upward.” Heidegger interprets the human as the being who stands in the clearing of Being. The human is not defined by rationality but by openness to Being. Latin homo shifts the focus to biological species. Heidegger’s Mensch is existential, not zoological. |
| 32 | ψυχή (psychē) | anima | Seele | soul / animating principle | ψυχή originally means breath or life‑force. For early Greeks, it is the principle of animation, not an immortal substance. Heidegger interprets ψυχή as a mode of Being‑in‑the‑world. Latin anima spiritualizes it. Later metaphysics turns ψυχή into a metaphysical entity. |
| 33 | νοῦς (nous) | intellectus | Geist | mind / intuitive apprehension | νοῦς is the faculty of direct apprehension of Being. It is not discursive reasoning but immediate insight. Heidegger sees νοῦς as a primordial mode of openness. Latin intellectus intellectualizes it. In Anaxagoras, νοῦς becomes a cosmic ordering principle. |
| 34 | ἔθος (ethos) | consuetudo | Gewohnheit | habit / custom | ἔθος is related to ἦθος but emphasizes habitual dwelling. Heidegger uses it to show how human existence is shaped by habitual ways of being. It is not merely social custom but existential patterning. Latin consuetudo narrows it to social habit. |
| 35 | ἄξιος (axios) | dignus | würdig | worthy / fitting | ἄξιος means worthy or fitting. Heidegger interprets it in relation to δίκη: beings are worthy insofar as they fit into the order of presencing. Worth is ontological, not moral. Latin dignus moralizes it. The term anticipates Heidegger’s notion of Würdigkeit (worthiness for Being). |
| 36 | ἔριον (erion) | lana | Wolle | wool / thread (metaphorical) | Used metaphorically in early Greek thought to describe the weaving of fate or order. Heidegger sometimes invokes weaving metaphors to describe the interlacing of presencing and absencing. The term suggests the texture of Being. Latin lana loses the metaphorical richness. |
| 37 | ἄναξ (anax) | dominus | Herr | lord / master | ἄναξ is a title for gods and kings. Heidegger uses it to illuminate the early Greek sense of divine ordering. It is not domination but presiding over the clearing. Latin dominus shifts toward ownership. Heidegger’s Herr is existential, not feudal. |
| 38 | δαίς (dais) | convivium | Mahl | feast / distribution | In Homeric Greek, δαίς refers to a feast where portions are distributed. Heidegger uses it metaphorically to describe the distribution of Being. It resonates with μοῖρα (allotment). Latin convivium misses the distributive nuance. |
| 39 | ἄγαλμα (agalma) | simulacrum | Abbild | image / shining‑forth | ἄγαλμα means a statue or image that shines with divine presence. Heidegger interprets it as a site where Being appears. It is not representation but manifestation. Latin simulacrum reduces it to imitation. The term anticipates Heidegger’s analysis of the artwork. |
| 40 | ἔργον (ergon) | opus | Werk | work / deed | ἔργον means work, deed, or accomplishment. Heidegger interprets it as the bringing‑forth of beings into presence. It is not mere labor but ontological production. Latin opus narrows it to product. Heidegger’s Werk is a site of world‑opening. |
| 41 | τέχνη (technē) | ars | Kunst / Technik | craft / bringing‑forth | τέχνη originally means a mode of revealing. It is not technology in the modern sense. Heidegger interprets τέχνη as a way in which truth happens. It is a bringing‑forth (Hervorbringen). Latin ars shifts toward skill. Modern Technik distorts it into instrumental control. |
| 42 | ποίησις (poiēsis) | poesis | Dichtung | bringing‑forth / poetry | ποίησις is the act of bringing something into presence. It is not limited to literary poetry. Heidegger interprets it as a fundamental mode of revealing. All creation is a kind of ποίησις. Latin poesis narrows it to literature. |
| 43 | ἀρχή (archē) | principium | Anfang / Ursprung | origin / principle | ἀρχή means beginning, origin, or ruling principle. For the Presocratics, it names the fundamental source of beings. Heidegger interprets ἀρχή as the primordial ground of presencing. It is not a cause but an originating sway. Latin principium shifts toward logical principle. |
| 44 | τέλος (telos) | finis | Ziel / Zweck | end / fulfillment | τέλος means completion or fulfillment, not termination. Heidegger interprets it as the consummation of presencing. It is the point at which something fully appears as what it is. Latin finis confuses it with cessation. Heidegger’s Ziel preserves the sense of fulfillment. |
| 45 | μέτρον (metron) | mensura | Maß | measure | μέτρον is central to Greek thought: everything has its measure. Heidegger interprets measure as the fittingness of beings within the clearing. It is not quantitative but ontological. Latin mensura narrows it to measurement. Heidegger’s Maß is existential. |
| 46 | ὕβρις (hybris) | superbia | Übermaß | excess / overreaching | ὕβρις is overstepping one’s measure. Heidegger links it to ἀδικία. It is not moral arrogance but ontological excess. Beings tend to assert themselves beyond their allotted place. Latin superbia moralizes it. |
| 47 | ἁρμονία (harmonia) | concordia | Fügung | harmony / fitting‑together | ἁρμονία means the fitting‑together of opposites. Heraclitus uses it to describe the hidden unity of strife. Heidegger interprets it as the jointure of Being. It is not aesthetic harmony but ontological articulation. Latin concordia moralizes it. |
| 48 | πῦρ (pyr) | ignis | Feuer | fire | For Heraclitus, fire is the metaphor for the ever‑living flux of Being. It symbolizes transformation and measure. Heidegger interprets fire as the dynamic presencing of Being. It is not a physical element but an ontological symbol. Latin ignis loses the metaphysical depth. |
| 49 | κόσμος (kosmos) | mundus | Welt | world / order | κόσμος originally means order, arrangement, adornment. It is not the universe as a container but the ordered whole of beings. Heidegger interprets κόσμος as world, the open region where beings appear. Latin mundus shifts toward a physical universe. Heidegger’s Welt is existential. |
| 50 | φύλαξις (phylaxis) | tutela | Bewahrung | preservation | φύλαξις means guarding or preserving. Heidegger uses it to describe the task of thinking: to preserve the truth of Being. It is not protection from danger but safeguarding unconcealment. Latin tutela narrows it to legal guardianship. Heidegger’s Bewahrung is ontological. |
| 51 | ἀνάγκη (anankē) | necessitas | Not / Zwang | necessity / compulsion | ἀνάγκη in early Greek thought names a binding force that even gods cannot escape. It is not logical necessity but the compelling sway of Being. Heidegger distinguishes ἀνάγκη from χρεών: the former is constraining, the latter is the inner “must” of presencing. In tragedy, ἀνάγκη marks the inescapable structure of fate. Latin necessitas flattens it into logical or causal necessity. |
| 52 | ἔθος / ἦθος (ethos) | mos / consuetudo | Sitte / Brauch | dwelling / habitual comportment | Though often translated as “ethics,” ἦθος originally means dwelling place or habitual abode. Heidegger retrieves this meaning to interpret Heraclitus’ fragment “ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων.” Ethos is the place where human beings dwell in relation to Being. It is not moral character but existential attunement. Latin mos moralizes it. |
| 53 | ἄγος (agos) | sacrum | das Heilige | the sacred / taboo | ἄγος refers to something sacred or taboo, often associated with divine prohibition. Heidegger interprets it as the dimension of the holy that precedes the gods. It marks the uncanny region where Being withdraws. It is not moral impurity but ontological danger. Latin sacrum narrows it to religious holiness. |
| 54 | ἄγχι (agchi) | prope | Nähe | nearness | ἄγχι means “near” or “close.” Heidegger uses nearness to describe the way Being approaches without becoming present. Nearness is not spatial proximity but existential intimacy. The gods are near even when absent. Latin prope lacks this ontological nuance. |
| 55 | ἀλήθευμα (alētheuma) | veritas | Wahrheitsgeschehen | truth‑event | ἀλήθευμα is a derivative of ἀλήθεια, meaning a truth or disclosure. Heidegger interprets it as an event in which beings emerge from concealment. It is not a proposition but a happening. Truth is something that occurs, not something possessed. Latin veritas reduces it to correctness. |
| 56 | ἄρρητον (arrhēton) | ineffabile | das Unsagbare | the unsayable | ἄρρητον means that which cannot be spoken. For the Greeks, this is not because of mystical ineffability but because Being exceeds conceptual grasp. Heidegger interprets the unsayable as the withdrawal of Being. It is not irrational but pre‑conceptual. Latin ineffabile spiritualizes it. |
| 57 | ἄρχειν (archein) | principari | herrschen | to rule / to begin | ἄρχειν means both to rule and to begin. Heidegger emphasizes this dual meaning to show that the origin (ἀρχή) is also the ruling principle. Being rules by beginning. Latin principari loses the ontological depth. Heidegger’s herrschen is existential, not political. |
| 58 | ἀρχή (archē) | principium | Ursprung | origin / source | Although we covered ἀρχή earlier, here we emphasize its role in Heidegger’s reading of the Presocratics. ἀρχή is not a first cause but the originating sway. It is the source that gives rise without itself being a being. Heidegger interprets it as the primordial ground of presencing. Latin principium reduces it to logical principle. |
| 59 | ἄρτιος (artios) | perfectus | vollkommen | complete / fitting | ἄρτιος means complete, perfect, or fitting. Heidegger uses it to describe the completeness of presencing when beings appear fully as themselves. It is not moral perfection but ontological fulfillment. Latin perfectus shifts toward moral or aesthetic perfection. |
| 60 | ἀσφάλεια (asphaleia) | securitas | Sicherheit | security / stability | ἀσφάλεια originally means firmness or stability. Heidegger interprets it as the stability of the clearing that allows beings to appear. It is not psychological security but ontological steadiness. Latin securitas becomes subjective. Heidegger’s Sicherheit is structural. |
| 61 | ἀταραξία (ataraxia) | tranquillitas | Gelassenheit | tranquility / letting‑be | ἀταραξία means unperturbedness. Heidegger links it to Gelassenheit, the letting‑be of beings. It is not emotional calm but existential openness. The term anticipates Heidegger’s later thought on releasement. Latin tranquillitas psychologizes it. |
| 62 | ἀτιμία (atimia) | ignominia | Ehrlosigkeit | dishonor / lack of worth | ἀτιμία means lack of honor or worth. Heidegger interprets it ontologically as the failure to dwell in the clearing of Being. It is not social shame but existential impoverishment. Latin ignominia moralizes it. The term contrasts with ἄξιος (worthy). |
| 63 | αὐγή (augē) | radius | Glanz | radiance / gleam | αὐγή means radiance or gleam. Heidegger uses it to describe the shining‑forth of beings in unconcealment. It is not physical light but ontological luminosity. Latin radius reduces it to a ray. Heidegger’s Glanz preserves the metaphysical sense. |
| 64 | βίος (bios) | vita | Leben | life | βίος means life in the sense of a way of living. Heidegger distinguishes it from ζωή (life as biological vitality). Bios is existential life. It is the manner in which a human being dwells. Latin vita conflates both senses. |
| 65 | γνῶσις (gnōsis) | cognitio | Erkenntnis | knowing / insight | γνῶσις is knowledge as insight, not as information. Heidegger interprets it as a mode of disclosure. It is not representational but participatory. Latin cognitio intellectualizes it. Heidegger’s Erkenntnis is always grounded in Being. |
| 66 | δαίμων (daimōn) | daemon | Dämon | guiding spirit | Although covered earlier, here we emphasize its role in Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus. The daimōn is the guiding force of one’s destiny. It is not a supernatural being but the way Being addresses a human. Latin daemon later becomes demonic. |
| 67 | δέος (deos) | timor | Furcht | fear / awe | δέος means fear or awe. Heidegger interprets it as the existential mood that opens the human to Being. It is not psychological fear but ontological trembling. Latin timor narrows it. Heidegger’s Furcht is a basic mood. |
| 68 | δέσποινα (despoina) | domina | Herrin | mistress / lady | In Parmenides’ proem, the goddess is addressed as δέσποινα. Heidegger interprets her as the presencing of truth itself. She is not a mythological figure but the personification of ἀλήθεια. Latin domina loses the ontological dimension. |
| 69 | διάνοια (dianoia) | discursus | Denken / Verstand | discursive thinking | διάνοια is discursive, step‑by‑step thinking. Heidegger contrasts it with νοῦς (intuitive apprehension). It is necessary but secondary. Latin discursus captures the movement but not the ontological grounding. Heidegger’s Verstand is calculative. |
| 70 | δίκη (dikē) | iustitia | Fug | fittingness / justice | Reiterated here to emphasize its centrality. δίκη is the structural order of Being. It is not moral justice but ontological jointure. Heidegger’s Fug captures this sense. Latin iustitia moralizes it. |
| 71 | δόξα (doxa) | opinio | Meinung | opinion / seeming | δόξα means appearance or seeming. For Parmenides, it is the realm of mortal opinion. Heidegger interprets δόξα as the everyday understanding of Being. It is not false but superficial. Latin opinio reduces it to subjective belief. |
| 72 | δύναμις (dynamis) | potentia | Möglichkeit | power / potentiality | δύναμις means potentiality or capacity. Heidegger interprets it as the possibility inherent in Being. It is not mere ability but ontological potential. Latin potentia shifts toward force. Heidegger’s Möglichkeit is existential. |
| 73 | εἶδος (eidos) | forma | Form | form / look | εἶδος originally means the look or appearance of something. Plato later turns it into the Idea. Heidegger retrieves the earlier sense: the way a being shows itself. Latin forma narrows it. Heidegger’s Form is phenomenological. |
| 74 | ἔθος (ethos) | habitus | Gewohnheit | habit / custom | Reiterated here to emphasize its existential meaning. Ethos is the habitual dwelling of human beings. It shapes how beings appear. Latin habitus shifts toward moral character. |
| 75 | ζῆν (zēn) | vivere | leben | to live | ζῆν means to live in the biological sense. Heidegger distinguishes it from existieren, which is uniquely human. Animals live; humans exist. Latin vivere conflates both. ζῆν is the basis for higher modes of Being. |
| 76 | ζῷον (zōion) | animal | Lebewesen | living being | ζῷον means a living creature, but not in the modern biological sense. For the Greeks, a ζῷον is defined by its capacity for perception and movement. Heidegger uses the term to distinguish animal life from human existence: animals are “poor in world,” whereas humans are “world‑forming.” Latin animal narrows the meaning to biological classification. Heidegger’s Lebewesen preserves the existential nuance. |
| 77 | ζωή (zōē) | vita | Leben | life (as vitality) | ζωή refers to life as sheer vitality, the fact of being alive. It contrasts with βίος, which means a way of life. Heidegger uses ζωή to mark the biological dimension of beings. It is the basis for higher modes of Being but not equivalent to human existence. Latin vita conflates ζωή and βίος. |
| 78 | ἔντεχνος (entechnos) | artifex | kunstvoll | skillful / artful | ἔντεχνος means “within the domain of τέχνη,” i.e., skillfully crafted. Heidegger uses it to show how early Greek thought saw craft as a mode of revealing. It is not mere technical proficiency but a way of bringing‑forth. Latin artifex reduces it to craftsmanship. Heidegger’s kunstvoll retains the ontological sense. |
| 79 | ἔνθεος (entheos) | inspiratus | begeistert | inspired / possessed by the divine | ἔνθεος literally means “in‑god,” indicating divine inspiration. Heidegger interprets it as a mode of ecstatic openness to Being. It is not irrational frenzy but heightened attunement. Latin inspiratus spiritualizes it. Heidegger’s Begeisterung (in‑spiritedness) captures the existential dimension. |
| 80 | ἔπος (epos) | verbum | Wort | word / utterance | ἔπος means a spoken word or utterance, often in epic poetry. Heidegger uses it to explore the primordial power of language. It is not a linguistic unit but a revealing event. Latin verbum reduces it to a grammatical term. Heidegger’s Wort is ontological. |
| 81 | ἔριον (erion) | lana | Wolle | wool / thread (cosmic weaving) | Reiterated here with a cosmological nuance: early Greek cosmology often uses weaving metaphors. Heidegger sees weaving as a metaphor for the interlacing of presencing and absencing. The cosmos is woven, not constructed. Latin lana loses the metaphysical resonance. |
| 82 | ἔρως (erōs) | amor | Liebe | desire / longing | ἔρως is the primordial longing that draws beings together. Heidegger interprets it as the pull of Being itself. It is not merely erotic desire but ontological attraction. Latin amor narrows it to emotional love. Heidegger’s Liebe is existential. |
| 83 | ἔστιν (estin) | est | ist | is / there is | The simple verb “is” becomes the central question of Western metaphysics. For Parmenides, “ἐστίν” names the self‑showing of Being. Heidegger reopens the question of the “is” as the forgotten foundation of ontology. Latin est becomes a logical copula. Heidegger’s ist is phenomenological. |
| 84 | ἦμαρ (ēmar) | dies | Tag | day | ἦμαρ means day, but for the Greeks it also signifies the realm of light and presence. Heidegger interprets it as the temporal clearing in which beings appear. It is not a unit of time but a mode of presencing. Latin dies loses the ontological depth. |
| 85 | ἦχος (ēchos) | sonus | Klang | sound / resonance | ἦχος means sound or echo. Heidegger uses resonance as a metaphor for how Being “resounds” in language. It is not mere auditory vibration but ontological reverberation. Latin sonus reduces it to physical sound. Heidegger’s Klang preserves the metaphysical sense. |
| 86 | θεῖον (theion) | divinum | das Göttliche | the divine | θεῖον refers to the divine as a quality, not a personal god. Heidegger interprets it as the dimension of the holy that precedes theology. It is the region where Being reveals itself as sacred. Latin divinum shifts toward metaphysical substance. Heidegger’s das Göttliche is existential. |
| 87 | θεός (theos) | deus | Gott | god | θεός originally means “the one who runs” or “the one who shines.” Heidegger interprets gods as modes of world‑disclosure. They are not supernatural beings but manifestations of Being. Latin deus becomes a metaphysical entity. Heidegger’s Gott is phenomenological. |
| 88 | θνητός (thnētos) | mortalis | sterblich | mortal | θνητός means mortal, capable of death. Heidegger emphasizes mortality as the defining feature of human existence. Mortality opens the human to Being. Latin mortalis is biological. Heidegger’s sterblich is existential. |
| 89 | ἱερόν (hieron) | sacrum | das Heilige | the holy | ἱερόν means holy or sacred. Heidegger interprets it as the region where Being reveals itself as worthy of reverence. It is not religious sanctity but ontological holiness. Latin sacrum narrows it. Heidegger’s das Heilige is foundational for his later thought. |
| 90 | ἱστορία (historia) | historia | Geschichte | inquiry / history | ἱστορία originally means inquiry or investigation. Heidegger retrieves this sense to critique modern historiography. True history (Geschichte) is the happening of Being. Latin historia becomes narrative history. Heidegger’s Geschichte is ontological. |
| 91 | κάλλος (kallos) | pulchritudo | Schönheit | beauty | κάλλος means beauty as radiant presence. Heidegger interprets beauty as a mode of truth’s happening. It is not aesthetic pleasure but ontological shining. Latin pulchritudo aestheticizes it. Heidegger’s Schönheit is tied to unconcealment. |
| 92 | κλέος (kleos) | gloria | Ruhm | glory / renown | κλέος means glory or fame, literally “what is heard.” Heidegger interprets it as the way a human being’s Being resounds in the world. It is not vanity but existential presence. Latin gloria moralizes it. Heidegger’s Ruhm is ontological. |
| 93 | κόσμος (kosmos) | mundus | Welt | world / order | Reiterated here to emphasize its centrality. κόσμος is the ordered whole of beings. Heidegger interprets it as world, the open region where beings appear. Latin mundus shifts toward physical universe. Heidegger’s Welt is existential. |
| 94 | κρύπτεσθαι (kryptesthai) | occultari | sich verbergen | to conceal / to hide | κρύπτεσθαι means to hide or conceal. Heidegger interprets it as the withdrawal of Being. Concealment is not negation but a necessary part of truth. Latin occultari mystifies it. Heidegger’s sich verbergen is structural. |
| 95 | λόγος (logos) | ratio | Rede | gathering / saying | Reiterated here to emphasize its foundational role. λόγος is the gathering that lets beings appear. Heidegger interprets it as the structural articulation of Being. Latin ratio narrows it to reason. Heidegger’s Rede is existential. |
| 96 | μέλος (melos) | carmen | Lied | song / measure | μέλος means song or melody. Heidegger uses it to describe the rhythmic unfolding of Being. It is not entertainment but ontological measure. Latin carmen poeticizes it. Heidegger’s Lied is existential. |
| 97 | μνήμη (mnēmē) | memoria | Erinnerung | memory / recollection | μνήμη means memory as recollection of what is present. Heidegger interprets it as the capacity to hold Being in mind. It is not psychological recall but ontological remembrance. Latin memoria narrows it. Heidegger’s Erinnerung is tied to thinking. |
| 98 | μοῖρα (moira) | fatum | Geschick | destiny / allotment | Reiterated here to emphasize its role in Heidegger’s thought. μοῖρα is the allotment given to each being. Heidegger interprets it as the sending (Geschick) of Being. It is not fatalism but ontological distribution. Latin fatum distorts it. |
| 99 | νύξ (nyx) | nox | Nacht | night | νύξ means night, the realm of concealment. Heidegger interprets night as the withdrawal of Being. It is not mere darkness but the hiddenness that makes unconcealment possible. Latin nox loses the ontological nuance. Heidegger’s Nacht is metaphysical. |
| 100 | ξένος (xenos) | hospes | Fremder | stranger / foreigner | ξένος means stranger or guest. Heidegger interprets the stranger as the one who stands outside the familiar clearing. The stranger reveals the limits of one’s world. Latin hospes conflates guest and host. Heidegger’s Fremder is existential. |
From Heidegger AI Textual Research Investigations: Early Greek