understanding receive its illuminating power? In which horizon does the understanding of being operate? Before we expressly answer this crucial question we must show that and how precisely philosophy, insofar as philosophy is guided by the question τί τὸ ὄν, also understands being as constant presence, and is itself to be grasped from this understanding. Here we must content ourselves with some minimal references to Plato and Aristotle.
§ 8. Demonstration of the Hidden Fundamental Meaning of οὐσία (Constant Presence) in the Greek Interpretation of Movement, What-Being, and Being-Actual (Being-Present)
We have set out from the everyday meaning of the word οὐσία, or more precisely, we have set out from what is intended in this word's pre- and extra-philosophical usage: beings qua house and home. or in the broader philosophical sense, every present being as present. If. guided by the question of what beings are as such. we now attend to the beings we proximally encounter (the things around us, whether natural or artificial) and if we ask about what constitutes their beingness, this question appears clearly posed and ready for an answer. However, the entire history of philosophy shows that this elementary question. precisely because it is elementary, is of the very greatest difficulty, and is ever again insufficiently prepared, i.e. elaborated.
a) Being and Movement: οὐσία as παρουσία of the ὑπομένον
When we inquire into what constitutes the being of a present thing, e.g. a chair, then we immediately ask about how we conceive a chair. or whether we can conceive it at all. But if we disregard the groundless and senseless question of whether we grasp a psychical image of the chair or the actual chair, if we hold fast to this present thing before us, everything is not yet in readiness for asking about what constitutes the thing's presence. There is a lot of talk in philosophy about objects and their objectivity, but without prior indication of what it means when e.g. someone has a chair present before him. We could say that things have now changed in this regard. We now see clearly that the chair standing there, in the room or in the garden, is not like a stone or a piece of wood from a broken branch, but that it (and similar things such as tables, cupboards, doors, steps) has a purpose. This purposiveness does not attach to such
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