being-beautiful of the individual things. Is the problem solved in this way? Not at all. It is only posed and made explicit, in that the 'being' of beautiful beings is spoken of, and indeed in the sense of being as presence. Despite everything, this 'presence' is utterly obscure, so that Socrates' answer is neither intelligible nor valid for the other participants in the conversation. This is shown by the way that Dionysodorus responds to Socrates. If the being-beautiful of a beautiful thing is supposed to consist in the presence of beauty, then the following results: if παραγένεται σοι ..., 'if an ox comes to stand alongside you, and is present beside you, are you then an ox? And are you, Socrates, perchance Dionysodorus, because I, Dionysodorus, now stand beside you (πάπειμι)?' Socrates' thesis that being-beautiful, or more generally, that the so- and what-being of an individual being consists in its presence, leads to obvious nonsense. In this way Plato wants to show that the situation in respect of this παρουσία, i.e. of the beingness of a being, is anything but self-evident. And if it is not self-evident, then the problem must be posed and worked through.
From this, as from many other passages, we can conclude that precisely where the pure so-being and what-being of things – rather than, e.g. their origination and dissolution – is spoken of, this word παρουσία is employed. παρουσία is not necessarily oriented to ἀπουσία as a counter-concept, nor is it used only in such contexts. On the contrary, παρουσία stands simply for ουσία, and expresses the meaning of ουσία more clearly. This is shown by the fact that precisely where the ουσία of the ὄν, e.g. the being-beautiful of existing beautiful things, becomes a problem, παρουσία crops up as a perfectly natural expression.
It would, however, be hasty and superficial to take our thesis that ουσία, being, means constant presence, as the key which immediately opens all doors – as if, wherever we encounter expressions concerning being, it merely sufficed to insert the meaning 'constant presence'.
c) Being and Substance.
The Further Development of the Problem of Being as the Problem of Substance.
Substantiality and Constant Presence
Nevertheless, we have obtained a crucial guideline for the interpretation of Greek philosophy, and indeed for the whole development of Western philosophy until Hegel. At any event, since antiquity the traditional
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