something that is only half actual. If that which is present (the beings themselves) is conceived as appearance, this an means nothing else but that the actuality of the actual consists in its character as appearance. To appear is to come into view, i.e. into the presence of a look, into the fully determining determinedness of the self showing beings themselves. Kant has the same understanding of being as Greek philosophy. It was not his fault, it was not his doing, if the primordial connection between the concept of appearance and the radically conceived problem of being had to remain hidden. Instead, when we talk about Kant and others in the usual glib way, it is we who art- at fault, it is we who belong to the debris rubbed off from the spirit of history.
In summary, we can say that the Aristotelian concept for the actuality of the actual, i.e. the concept of ἐνέργεια as well as the later concept of actualitas (actuality) determined by this, does not initially confirm our thesis of 'constant presence' as the fundamental meaning of being in (}reek philosophy. However, if we do not play games with words, crudely attempting to derive actuality [Wirklichkeit] from working [Wirken], but rather immersive ourselves in the Greek conception and interpretation of ἔργον as such, then we immediately become aware of the inner structural connection between the philosophical concept ἐνέργεια and οὐσία as παρουσία. At the same time, we thereby obtain an insight into the basic concept of the Platonic doctrine of being: ἰδέα, εἶδος . To grasp the Platonic doctrine of being as the 'doctrine of ideas', if this concept is taken purely doxographically, is admittedly an error. For Plato, being means what-being, and the 'what' of something is given in its look. The latter is the way beings present [präsentieren] themselves and are present [anwesend]. In the look of a thing there resides its presence (being).
That work in its workhood and producedness as such — whether as product of craft or as genuine art work — plays an essential role in the formation of the Greek concept of being must be clarified in terms of the fundamental attitudes of Greek Dasein. What these attitudes show is the wrenching of things and forms from and in the fearfulness Furchtbarkeit of existence. They expose the lies about the cheerfulness of Greek Dasein. Especially noteworthy is that, from an early date and for a long time, the word τέχνη stood for knowledge as a whole. i.e. simply for the making manifest of beings. τέχνη neither means technique as practical activity nor is limited to craft knowledge, but it signifies all producing in the broadest sense, together with its guiding knowledge. It expresses the struggle around the presence of beings. We cannot enter now into a discussion of other fundamental words of Greek ontology and their