broad implications. In discussing the concept of ἐνέργεια reference has already been made to Kant's concept of appearance. That beings as such have the character of appearance just means that the being of beings is understood as self· showing, as being-encountered, as presence. This interpretation of the Kantian concept of appearance, likewise our earlier interpretation of the Greek concept of being, goes beyond what is expressly stated by Kant and the Greeks; that is, our interpretation returns to that which stood within the horizon of their understanding of being. If we directly ask whether and how Kant himself explicitly interpreted and determined the actuality of actual beings, we can discover the following statement in the Critique of Pure Reason: 'That which is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual'.10 Actuality means a connection with sensation. We must, however, likewise forgo discussing how a sufficiently concrete interpretation of this determination of the essence of actuality supports what we have just said concerning Kant's concept of appearance.11
Our proposed elaboration of the leading question of metaphysics through to the fundamental question proceeds from the thesis that being means constant presence. We attempted to validate this thesis by an interpretation of the Greek concept of being - οὐσία - in its principal meanings. Clearly, everything that follows depends upon the validity of this interpretation. If this interpretation of being as constant presence is not correct, there can be no basis for unfolding a connection between being and time, as demanded by the fundamental question.
10 CPR A 218, B 226.
11 On 'being is not a real predicate', see Heidegger's 1927 lectures, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (trans. Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1 982), Part One, Chapter One.
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