we shall come across precisely this question concerning the origin of what- and that-being, i.e. possibility and actuality. From a metaphysical point of view, the problem of freedom has its centre here, and not in the problem of causality.
Freedom is to be discussed within the context of causality. What is the essence of causality? How does Kant determine the essence of causality? What is the problematic within which this definition of essence occurs? Running ahead a little we can say that it is the question concerning the possibility of experience. Experience is the only way in which man has knowledge of beings. The question of the possibility of finite knowledge is thus the question concerning the essence of the finitude of existence. The problem of causality, and thus also the problem of freedom, stand within this context. Ultimately, this is the primary and ultimate context, the only primordial and genuine context, of the problem of freedom. To be sure, this does not mean that the problem of freedom must be oriented to the problem of causality. Causality is not what most primordially pertains to the finitude of existence. The latter is not by any means primarily to be conceived from experience, from knowledge, from the theoretical. or even from the practical. So where is the deepest essence of man's finitude to be sought? Just in the understanding of being, in the occurrence of being {Seinsgeschehnis}. These are questions which arise when we inquire into the proper dimension of the problem of human freedom. More concretely then, and with a view to working through the problem: how must the highest essence of the finitude of existence be interrogated, and in which direction must it be unfolded, in order that a concrete guideline for the problem of freedom can emerge?
d) The Analogies of Experience as Rules of the Basic Relations of the Possible Being-in-Time of That Which Is Present
Solving the preliminary question concerning the Kantian definition of the essence of causality means interpreting his doctrine of the Analogies of Experience. Our general characterization of the latter has been concluded, ultimately by treating them as dynamical principles and in terms of the distinction between the mathematical and dynamical (essentia-existentia). In Kantian terminology, the 'Analogies' circumscribe the problem of the being-present of that which is present. What we must now discuss is the connection between this latter problem and the problems of causality and freedom.
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