unhidden is the beings and is taken as such (cf. the first stage). The more the unhidden is unhidden, the closer do we come to beings (μᾶλλον ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ ὄντος). So coming closer to beings goes together with the heightening of unhiddenness and vice versa. Closeness to beings, i.e. the being-with what is there [das Da-bei-sein des Da-seins], the inner proximity or distance of being-human to beings, the degree of the unhiddenness of beings, and the heightening of beings themselves as beings - these three are intertwined. Above all we must be clear that beings separate out into those that are more and those that are less beingful. There are 'beings that are more beingful'. Closeness and distance to beings changes the beings themselves.

4. The proximity to beings, as this is claimed for the second stage, has still another characteristic result: ὁ πρὸς μᾶλλον ὄντα τετραμμένος ὀρθότερον βλέποι. 'Whoever [like the former prisoner] is turned towards more beingful beings [towards what is more beingful than something else, thus to more genuine beings] sees more correctly.' Thus ὀρθὸς, ὀρθότης, 'correctness' [Richtigkeit] crops up, and indeed in the comparative, in an intensification: there are gradations. The correctness of seeing and viewing things, and thus of definition and assertion, is grounded in the particular manner of orientation and proximity to beings, i.e. in the way in which beings are in each case unhidden. Truth as correctness is grounded in truth as unhiddenness. We now see for the first time, albeit only roughly, a connection between the two forms of essence (concepts of truth), which at the beginning we only considered separately and stood alongside one another. Truth as correctness of assertion is quite impossible without truth as the unhiddenness of beings. For that to which the assertion must direct itself, in order to be correct, must already be unhidden. So if one takes the essence of truth exclusively as correctness of assertion, one betrays a complete lack of understanding. Not only does one stand before a derivative concept of truth, but, because one does not see the origin of this derivative concept, one calls upon a half-measure, which does not become full by everyone going along with it. On the other hand, one will only be able to grasp the essence and specific necessity of this derivative form of truth, truth as correctness,5 if truth qua unhiddenness is explained and its necessity grounded; that is, if one can clarify both the origin and the derivation. This is indicated by Plato's clear and simple statement: 'whoever is turned towards the more beingful beings, sees and talks more correctly'. This is a decisive step towards solving the problem of the relationship between the two concepts of truth.