outrageous to a sophisticated 'philosopher'. For the Greeks, nothing is more self-evident than to interpret possession of ἀλήθεια (i.e. knowledge) first of all as αἴσθησις.

However, the question arises as to how things stand with this now quite comprehensible thesis that ἐπιστήμη is αἴσθησις. Does αἴσθησις as perceivedness fulfil the demand we make of the essence of knowledge? Do we require of knowledge nothing else besides the perceivedness of something? How do things stand with this perceivedness itself? Through this self-showing, something becomes manifest, unhidden. Is perceivedness really the unhiddenness of beings?

This question can only be decided by inquiring into the essence of αἴσθησις, especially into whether it itself is or can be the possession of unhiddenness, i.e. into its ἀλήθεια-character. What does this mean?

We have heard that ἀλήθεια means the unhiddenness of beings. Thus, wherever possession of truth is found, possession of unhidden beings must also be present, i.e. the possessor must have a relationship to beings as such. The question of whether the perceivedness of something is unhiddenness leads to the question of whether αἴσθησις as such, in perceptual comportment as perceiving, contains a possible relationship to beings. The inquiry we now begin is occupied with the question of whether perceptual comportment as such can bring itself into a relationship to beings as beings, such that the unhiddenness of beings is given in the perceivedness occurring in such comportment.

§ 23. The Senses: Only Passage-way, Not Themselves What Perceives in Human Perception

In order to decide this question, it is necessary to investigate what this perceiving bringing-itself-into-relationship consists in, who or what is actually capable of such a relationship to the perceivable and perceived, and bears this relationship. Thus Socrates begins the critical demarcation of the essence of αἴσθησις with the words (184 b 8):

Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ᾽ ἐρωτῴη: ‘τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ μέλανα ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξέα καὶ βαρέα ἀκούει;’ εἴποις ἂν οἶμαι ‘ὄμμασί τε καὶ ὠσίν.’

[Theaetetus] Ἔγωγε.

'If then anyone should ask you, Theaetetus, how one sees white and black

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