αὐτῶν; If we leave the accents off διά τινος (nor did the Greeks write these) then we can just as easily, indeed we must, read it as διά τινος, where the sentence no longer is, or no longer needs to be, a question.3 The question first begins with τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ... The sentence ἡ δὲ δὴ διά τινος ... now becomes a more pointed summary of what the inquiry has thus far unfolded, and has the following meaning:

'Thus the faculty that somehow provides a passage-way, reveals to you what is common to your perceptions of colour, sound, and everything else, and which you call "is" and "is not".'

What has occurred through our writing διά τινος? What is the significance of our transposition of the question into a simple declaration? In the context of the whole train of thought it has the methodological meaning that Socrates once again establishes the existence of an excess of perception, thus of a faculty which provides a passage-way (that we do not recognize) to this and makes it perceivable. This is the undeniable state of affairs. With regard to what was previously seen, Socrates can once again, with full clarity, put the vital question:

τούτοις πᾶσι ποῖα ἀποδώσεις ὄργανα δι᾽ ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἕκαστα;

[δηλοῦν now stands for διανοεῖν] 'With what sense-organs do you perceive this common element [this δηλουμένοις, over and above colour and sound]?'

It is indubitably the case that something must provide a passage-way (διά τινος); i.e. it is not doubted that ἡ δύναμις is διά τινος. What remains in question is just the nature of this passage-way. Only by so asking do we arrive at the inner sense and movement of the thought. Otherwise the entire section would become superfluous and fail to correspond with the whole; it would not belong in the text at all. What is so extraordinary about every Platonic text is that each 'and', 'but', and 'perhaps' is set in a quite definite unambiguous position, i.e. these words are not just idle.

What then is the answer? To begin with there is none. Instead, Theaetetus himself attempts, by giving his own account of the matter, to establish what, in all perceptions of colour, sound, smell etc., is additionally perceivable. We see that the young Theaetetus does not simply defer to Socrates' superiority but wishes to enact the proof for himself in an originary way. This leads him to grasp the peculiar excess in what is perceivable in the perceptible (ταῦτα πάντα, 185 b 7) more directly and

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