question and following its connections through, he confined his utterances to what he was truly able to make his own.7

This answer of Theaetetus also spares Socrates from a long and tedious discussion (185 e 7 f.):

τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ὃ καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι.

'This, my dear Theaetetus, was also my opinion, and was what I wanted to show you.'

Socrates now sums up the unitary clarification achieved by Theaetetus (185 e 6 f.):

φαίνεταί σοι τὰ μὲν αὐτὴ δι᾽ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπεῖν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ σώματος δυνάμεων.

Here we again encounter ἐπισκοπεῖν. But notice that it is used for the perceiving of colour, sound etc., as well as (in the same sense) for the perceiving of being, non-being, being-different etc.

'In perceiving something the soul apprehends two things: τὰ μὲν, the one in itself and through itself; τὰ δὲ, the other by means of the bodily faculties.'

In other words, and in regard to the guiding question, it is denied that in perceptual comportment to the perceived the taking up of a relationship to the latter is twofold. Clearly, a duo is now combined and simultaneously separated. Both are present in perception: one, the indicated excess, being, non-being etc. is perceived by the soul itself; the other is likewise perceived by the soul, but by means of bodily faculties.

The second step of the inquiry has thus been completed; the answer has been given as to how the soul perceives being, non-being and the like.

C. Step Three:
The Soul's Relation to Being as Striving for Being

In the third step, which extends from 186 a 2 to b 10, the soul's relationship to being is more precisely characterized.

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