striving which perceives, and has in view, that for which it strives. σκοπεῖσθαι does not actually mean looking at, being occupied with this looking, but being occupied with something else, thereby already having in view.

Again the question is: what is perceived and held in view in this way? Plato says: ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα πρὸς ἄλληλα (σκοπεῖσθαι) τὴν οὐσίαν; 'being' naturally, and indeed 'especially in regard to the inter-connection' , thus the connection of the one with the other. Why does especially the connectivity in being come into view here? Why is the being-connected of the one to the other [Zueinander-sein] suddenly spoken of? Because new characters of being have been exhibited: goodness and delightfulness. Goodness e.g. is itself always the goodness of something for something, delightfulness likewise. Connectivity is not something additional, but belongs to the essential constitution of this being; it points to referential connections between the one and the other. The soul maintains such connections in view when it exists in its relationship to being. This πρὸς ἄλληλα, these referential connections, belong as such in the sphere of the εἰς ὅ, of striving for being, and are co-constitutive for the latter.

c) Interpretation of Connections of Being in the συλλογισμός

Thirdly, this perceiving of the connections of being receives a further decisive determination, i.e. it is characterized as ἀναλογίζεσθαι. This description pertains not so much to the connection itself as to the way this connection unfolds, corresponding to the characters of being itself. λόγος, λέγειν means to gather, to collect something in its connections, to bring together the one with the other, and indeed in such a way that both present themselves and come into view in this togetherness. But this becoming-viewed is not an objective grasping, nor is it any kind of logical-formal reflection or deduction. When we encounter the delightful and immerse ourselves in this, we do and must understand it (delightfulness), but this mode of being, while perceived, is not conceived. It is the connection to beings as beings, founded upon ἀλήθεια, the gathering of the self-showing into the singular (ἕν), the one enduring constancy of presence. Here λόγος does not mean 'thought' and on no account is to be grasped 'logically'; it must be understood from the context of οὐσία, ἀλήθεια, δόξα, νοεῖν. So λογίζεσθαι means to gather together several (things and) connections; to reckon with both in going from one to the other; more precisely: ἀνά, to go back-and-forth in collecting and in this way to reckon

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Martin Heidegger (GA 34) The Essence of Truth