§ 37. Double-Meaning of δόξα (View):
Look and Opinion

The question is now firmly aimed at defining the relationship to beings. Theaetetus answers (187 a 7):

Ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς ἐγᾦμαι, δοξάζειν.

'This comportment of the soul which you regard as knowledge [possession of truth] is, I believe, called δοξάζειν.'

Socrates agrees, and at once demands that Theaetetus dispense with the whole previous investigation concerning αἴσθησις, i.e. that he no longer make use of these earlier considerations. Theaetetus is not to argue on the basis of what has gone before by developing long speeches and clever proofs for new wide-ranging theories. This is not because the matter has been settled, or these earlier ideas refuted, but in order that Theaetetus should keep his mind open for the indicated field of phenomena - to consider, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾷς (187 b 1), whether in some way he now has a clearer vision of the essence of ἐπιστήμη.

The investigation begins anew, as if nothing had happened, and yet the previous results remain somehow in the background.

According to the second answer, the essence of knowledge consists in that comportment of the soul which is called δοξάζειν. This verb is usually translated as 'opine' [meinen], and the noun δόξα as 'opinion' [Meinung]. This translation only goes half-way to capturing the Greek meaning of the word, a half-measure which, as everywhere and particularly here, is more dangerous than complete error. With this translation, which is only conditionally fitting in certain cases, the fundamental meaning of the Greek word is obscured. The situation the Greeks have in mind is covered up and it is thus no wonder that this fitting/non-fitting translation of the word hinders the understanding of the problems lying concealed behind it. But these problems must be brought out if one wants to understand the way in which Plato's and Aristotle's treatment of the δόξα forces the question of the essence of truth, and thus the question of the essence of being, along a specific future track from which it has still not departed. For us who have long proceeded along this track, or rather, who have settled down comfortably upon it, its direction seems so self-evident that we cannot imagine any other way of questioning. On the other hand, the false translation is excused firstly by the fact that the word was also ambiguous for

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