the Greeks, secondly by the fact that in a certain sense 'opinion' is a fitting translation, and thirdly by the circumstance that the German language apparently does not have a word that preserves the ambiguity and at the same time gives the total meaning of δόξα. After giving a general indication of their meaning, we shall initially leave δόξα and δόξάζειν untranslated.

As with ἀλήθεια, ψεῦδος, λανθάνω, ἐπιστήμη, we give a brief indication of the concrete meaning of the words δόξα and δόξάζειν. My purpose is to show, from the substantive context of the dialogue as we have followed it, why Theaetetus comes to precisely this second answer, namely that the essence of ἐπιστήμη must reside in the region of δόξα.

On the basis of the positive investigation prompted by the first answer, Socrates indicates the sphere in which the essence of knowledge must be sought. The essence of knowledge can be located only in that sphere where the soul itself has dealings with beings - in short, in the sphere of the soul's relationship to beings (striving for being), in the sphere of the possibility of the possession of the unhiddenness of beings. Looked at closely, this involves a double claim: the essence of knowledge is determined firstly through that which has the character of a relationship to beings, but also through that which gives and makes available these beings in their presence and manifestation, thus such that these beings can and do show themselves from themselves. To be sure, αἴσθησις is unable to do this, but the discussion of the first answer in no way disputes that αἴσθησις is relevant, indeed that something like a becoming-manifest and self-showing of beings is essential for the unhiddenness of beings; it is only said that αἴσθησις by itself and as such cannot do this.

The question remains as to how the self-showing of beings is and must be possible. In short, there now emerges the task of discovering a phenomenon whose essential constitution involves firstly a self-showing of the beings themselves, secondly the relationship to being as this occurs from the soul itself. It is precisely this double claim that Theaetetus intends by referring to δόξα (δόξάζειν). More accurately, just as the first answer had recourse to the immediately obvious αἴσθησις, so this second answer has recourse to the phenomenon of δόξα as this is familiar from unreflective life. Why can and must Theaetetus fall back upon the δόξα? What does δόξα mean for the Greeks?

Let us begin with the verbs δοκεῖν, δοκέω, i.e. I show myself, either to myself or to others. In a certain sense the word is the exact counter-concept to λανθάνω, I am hidden (hide myself) to others or to myself. I

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