THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH


show myself to myself: I come before myself as such and such, I appear before myself and others. This appearing-before-myself-and-others has the meaning of offering an appearance. But this is a self-showing in some way or another. This self-showing leaves it open whether what shows itself is or is not that which it shows itself as. It shows itself, i.e. it appears, and in this appearing, in this stepping forth, it appears to be this or that. This appearance leaves it undecided whether it is mere illusion or whether it is indeed what it appears to be.

For the fundamental meaning of δοκέω (δόξα) it is important to keep firmly in mind that it involves the self-showing of something, above all the offering of a look or view. Instead of citing arbitrary examples we choose a passage from our dialogue (143 e 6) that we mentioned earlier in connection with Socrates calling Theaetetus beautiful while Theodorus calls him ugly.2 At the beginning of the conversation Socrates asks Theodorus to name a young Athenian whom he believes to have a good future. Theodorus replies that he knows one such person:


Καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν καλός, ἐφοβούμην ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καί τῳ δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ εἶναι.


'If he were beautiful, I would hesitate to call him such, lest I give the impression to anyone that I bear a passion for him.'


Schleiermacher translates, characteristically, 'lest someone believe [of me]';3 the Greeks say, by contrast, 'lest I appear before someone as such and such', 'who gives the impression'. Thus precisely the same reversal of linguistic usage as with λανθάνω.4 δοκέω I appear to others or to myself as . . . ; only from this does δοκεῖν obtain a further meaning: I seem to myself to be such and such. Iliad VII, 192: ἐπεὶ δοκέω νικησέμεν Ἕκτορα δῖον. 'I appear to myself as someone who - I believe of myself, I have the opinion that, I shall defeat Hector/ This is a characteristic reversal of the meaning: the state of affairs is no longer seen from the standpoint of that which shows itself, from the object, but from those who are looking at it, i.e. from this comportment; from those to whom something is shown and presented (this is himself: he presents himself to himself, he holds himself for such and such) and who thus have a view of what shows itself.

This same ambiguity also pertains to δόξα. The word means on the one hand: the look and view that someone offers or wherein something stands; in the accentuated sense: public reputation, honour, fame; in the New Testament: δόξα θεοῦ, brilliance, magnificence. Thereupon: what


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Martin Heidegger (GA 34) The Essence of Truth (2004)