the one and the other (Theaetetus and Socrates). To have a view means: to know something as something and to see this one thing as such and such, i.e. as something else. In Greek terms: to the object of δόξα there belongs ἕτερον - ἕτερον. The object to which a view relates is actually twofold: something (the one), which is taken for something else. In its essence, the δόξα has two objects. It is for this reason that Plato employs the term ἀμφότερα.

Hitherto, in the case of αἴσθησις (perceiving something), ἀμφότερα meant both together; now, on the contrary: both (ἀμφότερα) are known and not known

This is why, suddenly and without further introduction, the οἴεσθαι crops up, to take something as something, or also ἡγεῖσθαι: previously undiscussed modes of comportment which even now are not at all emphasized, but which Socrates has to draw upon in order to treat of δόξα and distorted view.

Since Socrates leads Theaetetus through all these moments of the phenomenon, the latter's understanding is sharpened, even though he initially takes the ψευδὴς δόξα to be an utterly impossible phenomenon. Socrates even wants to awaken this insight in Theaetetus, so that the latter may understand why this phenomenon continues to disturb him (Socrates).

In investigating the phenomenon both have proceeded κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι (188 c 9 f.), on the presupposition that a false view is a knowing and a not-knowing. Since such impossibilities have emerged, since the first perspective (either knowing or not-knowing) has led to the impossibility of the phenomenon, while on the other hand the fact of distorted views cannot be denied, Socrates now asks whether the investigation should not instead proceed κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ, in respect of being and non-being.

b) Second Perspective:
Alternatives of Being and Non-being

So the second investigation (188 d to 189 b 9) begins. Yet Theaetetus does not initially understand how this perspective of being and non-being is supposed to reveal something about the essence and possibility of the ψευδὴς δόξα.

The second attempt to approach the phenomenon of the ψευδὴς δόξα proceeds in a different way to the first. To be sure, it proceeds from

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