i.e. there is nothing between them.

We would misunderstand the whole meaning and difficulty of this second attempt of Socrates and Theaetetus if we believed, as is the usual interpretation, that Theaetetus commits logical errors here, and that Socrates/ Plato is engaged in a frivolous game of words. The opposite is the case. In the manner in which Socrates guides Theaetetus, the dialogue makes a tremendous effort to combat the domination of everyday talk and to resist the power of that healthy common sense that thinks in mere words and sentences. That the non-existing and the nothing, the μὴ ὄν and the οὐδέν, are not the same, is, until Plato, not at all self-evident. That ὁρᾶν it and δοξάζειν τι are not equivalent in their comportmental character is even less self-evident. That there is something 'between' knowing and not-knowing, and between being and being-nothing, is certainly not self-evident. And that this intermediate is more than an intermediate: this is quite hidden to the self-evidence of the common understanding. In the interpretation of the domination of the self-evident we should not assume a posture of superiority, dismissing these attempts to grasp the phenomenon as erroneous and primitive. Both these attempts to grasp the essential constitution of the ψευδής δόξα fail because their guiding perspectives do not suffice, or, more precisely and carefully put, because these perspectives are not sufficiently worked through in regard to what is required by the phenomenon. The guiding fundamental principles do not prescribe how the phenomena must be, but the phenomena themselves come first, and it is they which prescribe how the guiding fundamental principles must be constructed.

Externally, nothing is attained, and yet this one thing is achieved: the puzzling character of the phenomenon is heightened and shows itself in its various aspects. To be sure, it seems as if the reflection only circles around the phenomenon; at bottom, however, this circling around is a constant narrowing of the circle, i.e. a coming closer. That the sequence of three attempts does proceed in this way can be easily seen from the beginning of the third attempt and its guiding perspective.

c) Third Perspective:
The ψευδής δόξα as ἀλλοδοξία
(Substitution instead of Confusion)

The third attempt (189 b 10 to 190 e 4) proceeds in a different way to the previous two. Without any further preparation, directly and as it were

[276-277] 197

Martin Heidegger (GA 34) The Essence of Truth