instead of another thing, this means: in saying to oneself it is set forth as such and such, re-presented as it were.

In this description of διάνοια as λέγειν we have the essential character of re-presenting to oneself as a saying to oneself. From this we derive the broad meaning of λόγος, also confirming that the Greeks did not define the primordial essence of saying and speaking, thus of language, in terms of its oral expression, nor in terms of its optical manifestations in signs and the like; at the same time we see that the essence of language is inwardly rooted in the essence of the soul. It cannot be surprising that the authentic comportment of the soul is defined as a saying, as a questioning and answering, as a yes- and no-saying, if, that is, the soul is what bears and determines the essence of man, and if, for the Greeks, man is the living being who has saying at his disposal, i.e. who strives sayingly to his ownmost being.

Only now do we understand why διανοεῖσθαι, the relationship of the soul to being, was earlier conceived as ἀναλογίζεσθαι and συλλογισμός. The λόγος as the relation of gathering, of the gathered perceiving of something singular, is the original meaning of συλλογισμός. From this we clarify ἀλλοδοξία: the positing, the re-presenting to oneself of the one instead of the other, proves to be a saying of the one for the other. What the soul actually says is being. Irrespective of whether it occurs in the form of an assertion, saying is in each case a saying of being, a saying of is or is-not. To be of a view: this is a saying to oneself and a positing as such and such. What is posited instead of the other is always such and such. In the δόξα there always resides the saying and representing to oneself of being.

What we positively obtain from this discussion of the inner speech of the soul is that the δόξα involves a comportment in some sense similar to what we already know as the soul's relationship to beings - this is indeed necessary, in order that it should be at all possible for a comportment to be true or untrue.

Secondly: precisely this new characteristic now leads the examination of the ψευδής δόξα completely away from its path. To posit the one instead of the other would mean saying that the one is the other, e.g. that the beautiful thing is ugly, the fitting thing unfitting. This is quite impossible. It would never occur to us to say, not even in a dream, that the beautiful is ugly, the straight crooked. No one will ever say that an ox is a horse or that two are one. But if saying one for the other is ruled out, then the ἀλλοδοξια is in itself impossible.

Whoever, therefore, as is indeed the case with δόξα, re-presents the one

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Martin Heidegger (GA 34) The Essence of Truth