§4 [1112]

act of onlooking, whereby the onlooking does nevertheless not posit and create the ἰδέα but, instead, perceives it.

Yet this indeed seems to have been said already, in the dictum of Parmenides which refers to νοεῖν in its belonging to being. Is εἶναι not here already νοούμενον, thus ἰδέα? Precisely not; precisely that step lies far off. Instead, νοεῖν and εἶναι are named in their belonging to ἀλήθεια. And this is essentially different from the coupling of ἀλήθεια and νοῦς under the yoke of the ἰδέα.

But the ἰδέα as ἀγαθόν moves into the domain of making possible and thus of explaining—conditioning—producing—αἴτιον; αἴτιον is ἀρχή. Yet ἀρχή is not inceptually αἴτιον.

With this step toward the ἀγαθόν, being turns into a being, into the highest being of such a kind that it causes being—not into the being which is inceptually.

These are not the same: the being in the highest sense (the highest being) and that which, as pure being, is never a being and yet precisely for that reason remains the pure essential occurrence and inceptually and uniquely “is”—more inceptually than that ἔστιν of the εἴναι in Parmenides.

But then, and before all else, we must consider: Ἀλήθεια is the disconcealment of concealment and occurs intrinsically in the abyssal and the enigmatic. And that is not simply a barrier placed in the way of human understanding; on the contrary, the abyssal character is the essential occurrence itself—the act of beginning.

Indeed the question of the relation to Ἀλήθεια and to the beginning still remains—undetermined in the first beginning, and in the other beginning: Da-sein.

3. Errancy

is the extreme distorted essence of truth.

4. Ἀλήθεια (Plato)

In the Pseudo-platonic ὅροι (definitions):


Ἀλήθεια ἕξις ἐν καταφάσει καὶ ἀποφάσει· ἐπιστήμη ἀληθῶν.

Unconcealedness—comportment in affirming and denying. “Knowledge” of what is unconcealed.