In this μή, the uniqueness of being is brought to a disconcealing, although its ground cannot be experienced inceptually.
The μὴ ὄν—what never could or can “be” a being, i.e., emerge as a being.
The shadow that everywhere follows beings?
The shadow the first illumination of being itself? Why then inceptually already the not? Why does this become so preeminent that it places itself, so to speak, beside the ὄν? What is involved in this “not”?
93. To show the first (beginning)
and so illuminate the relation to what is inceptual.
This showing thinks for the first beginning, in that it illuminates the truth of being; out of this truth, the beginning occurs more inceptually now and in the future.
The first beginning requires the other one; otherwise it would not be the first. Indeed this requiring is not a lack; on the contrary, it is the unexhausted riches of what is first, which uniquely encompasses the preliminary character of the beginning.
94. The concealed ineffability of the first beginning
eventuates in the experience of the fact that beyng is. The event-related “fact that” is illuminated first as ἀλήθεια. In the pure “fact that” is the inceptual event. To experience this means to endure, without support or foothold in beings, the fact that being is illuminated in its abyssal remoteness, that a clearing essentially occurs; and it means to be without an utterance.
The pain of the inceptual separateness
the horror of the abyss
the bliss of the departure.
The inceptual pain is the original unity of horror and bliss; not a compound out of both. (On the “fact that” and the later distinction between the “that something is” and the “what something is,” cf. Aus der Geschichte des Seyns. II. Projection23)
23. Aus der Geschichte des Seyns. In Nietzsche II. {GA6.2, p. 417–18}