III. The difference [124–125]

170. The difference and nothingness

The inceptual nothingness is the purely bestowing clearing as the event of the turning. In this nothingness, the refusal essentially occurs as the basic trait of the abyss.

Out of this nothingness and its negativity, i.e., its refusing, i.e., its inceptuality, the “not” and the “no” are determined in the difference. Yet inasmuch as nothingness is beyng, beyng is essentially the difference as the inceptually concealed and refused departure.

171. The difference and the event

In the difference and out of it, being never “comes to” beings as a “predicate,” nor is being in relation to beings something to which they are “entitled” and their state of affairs. On the contrary, in the difference beings rather “come to” being, i.e., they “approach” being in that they come forth—toward—being in the clearing. Beings arise from beyng.

Being, however, ises1 as the appropriating event. Being is not always. It itself brings time-space in the clearing and thus first grants the possibility of determination, explicitly on the basis of beings, according to the now and then.

“Constancy” and “moment” already belong in the appropriation of the difference and so cannot be utilized to determine the event.

172. The difference

(the differentiation and

which first allows beings to arise as beings, and separates them to themselves, is the ground of all separations in which beings can first “be” these respective individuals.

The separations and the things separated make possible something other than the usual “differentiating,” on the basis of which we characterize thinking as a “representing.”

The difference does not separate being as the supersensory world from beings as the sensory world; on the contrary, all things, the sensory, non-sensory, supersensory, are beings and different from being.

1. Istet: third-person singular form of the coined verb isten, “to is.”—Trans.