III. The difference [131–133]

interrogated, but the differentiation, as the “ontological difference,” is indeed objectified and made subservient to the question of the condition of its possibility.

This expedient would at least have been able to indicate the question- worthiness of the differentiation, that it is worthy of questioning; but even this did not succeed, because instead of being gathered toward this question, everything was read as a kind of “anthropology.” Even the clarification of transcendence on the basis of ecstatic temporality [Zeitlichkeit] was of no avail. And yet thinking must take this course, because it is the most proximate path in the transition from metaphysics into the history of being.

If, however, the differentiation does not by way of representation first make and bring forth the difference, if instead it follows the difference and arises only out its essence itself, if the difference pertains to, and is, beyng itself, and if beyng is everywhere unavoidable in beings, then there must also be possible, even if for a transformed humanity, an experience of beyng itself, i.e., an experience of the difference.

Are there ways that lead into the difference?

Which are the marks that call attention to the possibility of an experience of the difference?

In what direction must the difference itself be thought in advance? Of what sort is this thinking?

We must learn the enduring of the difference in the departure. In this enduring, the pure essential occurrence of the difference is experienced out of the departure, and this essential occurrence no longer needs beings.

We must, however, also learn to think what is beingless, back beyond the negativity of beings; beinglessness is closed to all metaphysical representation, which is utterly unable to think nothingness.

The difference distinguishes being and what is beingless. Yet beinglessness is an event of beyng itself. Beinglessness is the first reflection of the luster of the riddle which is concealed in the event (on what is beingless, cf. “Event and Dasein” in Über den Anfang {GA70, p. 117ff.}).

Beyng differentiates itself from what is beingless, and this differentiation is the inceptual event.

The beinglessness of (beings) is the inceptual event of the dispropriation; the inceptual dispropriation in the sense of withholding. This dispropriation is an inceptual and still undisentangled reversal into the groundless beginning.

Beinglessness and the event of the between, wherein the coming up against beings, which thus first free themselves for their truth, turns back into the event. This “against” is essentially other than the